Lessons learned from experiments conducted on radar data management systems by Pierce, Mark William.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1994-06
Lessons learned from experiments conducted on
radar data management systems
Pierce, Mark William.








Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.




Captain, United States Air Force
B.S., College of Great Falls, 1985
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of







Security Classification of this page
REPORTS DOCUMENTATION PAGE
la Report Security Classification
UNCLASSIFIED
lb Restrictive Markings
2a Security Classification Authority 3 Distribution Availability of Report
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Zb Declassification/Downgrading Schedule 5 Monitoring Organization Report Number(s)





7a Name of Monitoring Organization
Naval Postgraduate School
6c Address (city, state, and ZIP code)
Monterey, CA 93940-5000
7b Address (city, state, and ZIP code)
Monterey, CA 93940-5000




9 Procurement Instrument Identification Number
8c Address (city, state, and ZIP code) 10 Source of Funding Numbers
Program Element Number Project No. Task Work Unit Accession No.
11 Title (Include Security Classification)
LESSONS LEARNED FROM EXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED ON RADAR DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (UNCLASSIFIED)
12 Personal Author(s)
Pierce, Mark W.









The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department
of Defense or the U.S. Government.
17 Cosati Codes: Field Group Subgroup
18 Subject Terms (continue on reverse if necessary and identity by block number)
Mimmumally Attended Radars, Radar Data Management Systems (RDMS), Region Operations Control Center (ROCC)
19 Abstract (continue on reverse if necessary and identity by block number)
The thesis provides lessons learned from experiments conducted by the ll tn Air Force to verify the capabilities of two vendor-produced
Radar Data Management Systems (RDMS). The first part of the thesis provides background information explaining the impetus for such
experiments and why a lessons learned approach was taken. The experimental plan and the final report from the PACAF experiments are
analyzed using evaluation tools taught in the C3 curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School. The lessons learned from the mistakes made
during these experiments are applied to produce a revised Experimental Plan. A lessons learned section follows the analysis. This section
discusses specific lessons learned from the 11th Air Force experiments as well as more general lessons learned by the author. The thesis
concludes with two chapters that provide overall conclusions and a summary, and recommendations for future work that can be accomplished
in the area of radar data management.
20 Distribution/Availability of Abstract
unclassified/unlimited A same as report DTIC users
21 Abstract Security Classification
UNCLASSIFIED
22a Name of Responsible Individual
Dr. William G. Kemple




DD FROM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
security classification of this page
Unclassified
ABSTRACT
The thesis provides lessons learned from experiments conducted by the
1
1
m Air Force to verify the capabilities of two vendor-produced Radar Data
Management Systems (RDMS). The first part of the thesis provides background
information explaining the impetus for such experiments and why a lessons
learned approach was taken. The experimental plan and the final report from the
PACAF experiments are analyzed using evaluation tools taught in the C3
curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School. The lessons learned from the
mistakes made during these experiments are applied to produce a revised
Experimental Plan. A lessons learned section follows the analysis. This section
discusses specific lessons learned from the 1 1th Air Force experiments as well as
more general lessons learned by the author. The thesis concludes with two
chapters that provide overall conclusions and a summary, and recommendations
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I. INTRODUCTION
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) is presently acquiring a radar data management
system (RDMS). This system is intended to both reduce the amount of radar
clutter presented to the operator and reestablish radar sensitivity which was
deliberately reduced for reasons to be given below. The underlying problems
that would be solved by acquiring a RDMS were due to the fact that radar
technology was upgraded faster than the technology of the computers that
process the radar data in the air defense command and control (C2) architecture.
In 1983, a new generation of radar became operational. The gap between radar
and computer technologies immediately created a problem; the collective input of
radar data overwhelmed the central computer. To relieve this burden, engineering
change proposals (ECPs) were implemented to reduce radar sensitivity and, thus,
the amount of data forwarded to the central computer.
The ECPs were intended as a temporary solution, but they are still being
used. The ECPs arbitrarily filter radar data and, as a result, actual targets may be
filtered out, and air defense operations may be compromised. A more permanent
solution is needed.
In 1990-1991, two defense contractors claimed to have developed radar data
management devices that exploited new computer technology to reduced the
volume of data in a more selective way. By using these devices, the radar could
be restored to full operational capability, and the volume of data could still be
kept small enough for the existing C2 computers to process. The possibility of
overloading the computer would be small.
PACAF is anxious to exploit this technological improvement. It would allow
them to better fulfill their mission requirements and still delay procurement of a
1
new generation of air defense computers. Before committing to this course of
action, PACAF wanted to assess the validity of the two manufacture's claims, and
identify the best system.
An experiment was conducted by the ll tn Air Control Wing (ACW) at
Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. The data collection had to be done in a manner that
would not interfere with the performance of the Region Operations Control
Center (ROCC) operational mission, but actual field trials were preferred to




tn ACW attempted to analyze this data to see whether the
manufacture's claims were true and to determine which manufacture's equipment
performed better, they could not. They found that the massive volume of data
collected did not include the information necessary to fully answer the questions:
"Will the manufacture's equipment eliminate data on tracks necessary for the
conduct of air operations? " The llm ACW needed to be able to identify the
tracks, but that information was not available.
The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine this case and document
what went wrong. General questions such as:
can experiments be successfully conducted within the operational
environment?
will be addressed, but the primary emphasis will be on the PACAF experiment.
II. BACKGROUND
This chapter provides background information that is necessary to
understand the following analysis of the PACAF experiment. The Impetus For
Change Section explains the radar data management problems and why a
solution is needed. The System Description Section describes the components
directly involved with radar data management. A description of the RDMS as a
potential solution along with the anticipated benefits to the command and control
system are addressed in the Radar Data Management Equipment Description
Section. Finally, the Special Considerations Section illustrates the challenges of
conducting an experiment in an operational environment.
A. IMPETUS FOR CHANGE
The Alaska NORAD Region (ANR) was driven by several factors to change
the way radar data was managed. The decline of the Soviet threat and resulting
draw down of the American military machine was a principal factor. In 1990, the
U.S. Air Force began a slow process of reorganization, within which the Alaskan
Air Command (AAC) ceased to be a major command. It became the ll m Air
Force, under the organizational command of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). The
reorganization meant that the 1 1" 1 AF now had to go through PACAF for all of
its funding, including justification of the funding for existing programs.
The eruption of Mount Pinatubo in Philippines and resulting loss of Clark Air
Base was another factor. Clark Air Base was the location of an air training
exercise called Cope Thunder, a major exercise PACAF used to train its forces in
Asia. PACAF needed to fill the void left by the loss of Clark AB and thus Cope
Thunder, and Alaska was seen as the best replacement. The Alaskan theater
provided many opportunities: large training areas over sparsely populated areas;
the capability to add more training areas; in-theater tanker support; two large
bases capable of handling an expanding number of fighter squadrons as well as
accommodating visiting squadrons; a well established command and control
network (ANR ROCC and AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System));
and new developments for integrating theater wide command and control
facilities that were already in progress (i.e., Commander's Theater Information
System (CTIS) and Aircraft Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation (AQVQ)).
PACAF decided to move Cope Thunder to Alaska, and plans were put
together to expand the training ranges. But, radar coverage within the proposed
training areas was not adequate to provide safe operations. Additional radars
were needed, and an initial increment of two was requested to increase low level
coverage. To be effective, the additional radars had to be integrated into the
ROCC, but the central computer is a weak link because of its limited processing
capability. Therefore, adding more radars, especially radars concerned with low
level coverage, which produce more clutter than radars concerned with high level
coverage, meant a much greater chance of overloading the ROCC central
computer.
Radar data management became a key issue. Given the factors of limited time
(PACAF was proceeding rapidly with the range improvement project), limited
funding (most of the funding was going for range improvements), limited
computer processing power of the ROCC computer, and limited sensitivity of
existing radars caused by the ECPs; the ll"1 ACW staff knew one possible
answer. They had been working on the issue of radar data management for over
a year and knew of commercial-off-the shelf equipment that would be low cost,
quickly installed, reliable, maintainable, and interoperable with the existing and
new radars and with the ROCC. This new equipment was available from two
defense contractors.
The ll tn ACW was tasked with investigating both potential solutions and
making recommendations about which, if any, system to use, and how to use it.
The first major task was to confirm the claims made by the defense contractors.
Experimental plans were drawn and experiments were run to test the systems.
Would the RDMSs allow the ECPs to be removed from the radars to restore their
sensitivity, and at the same time reduce the amount of clutter being sent to the
central computer without eliminating valid air tracks?
The 1 l tn ACW staff was in charge of planning and executing the experiment,
analyzing the data, and making recommendations about the radar data
management systems. Shortly after the experiments concluded, the author, who
was in charge of the experiment, was accepted to the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS). The data had not been closely analyzed, and with the training received at
NPS, a thorough analysis finally could be done. Looking back, many mistakes
had been made with the experiment, so many that a comprehensive analysis could
not be done. Therefore, this thesis will examine what went wrong, propose a new
plan, and provide lessons learned.
B. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The RDMS is aimed at solving the radar data management problem of the
ANR, specifically the ROCC. The ROCC is the center for command and control
in Alaska. This command and control architecture is described in the following
paragraphs. First, roles and missions are examined, then the system components
and their roles in radar data management are addressed.
1. Roles and Missions
Command and control is unique in Alaska, literally serving two masters.
Operationally, the ANR reports directly to NORAD Headquarters. The mission is
to provide "...warning of a surprise attack against North America, and
surveillance, control, and defense of our sovereign airspace [Ref. 1]."
Administratively, the 1 l tn Air Force reports directly to PACAF for everything it
needs to carry out its assigned mission.
2. System Components
Two components of the ROCC are directly involved with the radar data
management problems, the long range radars, better known as Minimally
Attended Radars (MAR) and the ROCC central computer located at the ROCC.
They are described below. The radar data flows from the MAR to the ROCC
central computer via a commercially leased satellite. The flow of data is depicted
in Figure 1 [Ref. 2].
a. Long Range Radars
Long range radars are the heart of the Alaskan air defense network.
Figure 2 depicts the approximate radar locations in Alaska. In 1983, a new type
of radar became operational. "The AN/FPS-117 Minimally Attended Radar
(MAR) is designed to provide long-range accurate aircraft identification and
position data..." The MAR provides "...digital output messages containing range,
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Two radar-related factors contribute to the radar data management
problems. The first factor is the extreme sensitivity of the radar. The unclassified
operational characteristics of the radar provide an insight. Rotating 360 degrees
every 12 seconds, the radar search volume is from 5 to 200NM, +6 to +20
degrees elevation, a 100,000 feet altitude limit, range resolution of .5NM, and a
range accuracy of .25NM [Ref. 3].
The second contributing factor is the adverse clutter environment
found in Alaska. "The clutter environment in Alaska is difficult for radar
operation because of unique terrain, a wide range of temperatures, extreme
weather, and a large migratory bird population [Ref. 3].
b. ROCC Central Computer
The ROCC Central Computer is the central point for processing the
data received from all of the radar sites. This fully redundant computer is the
Achilles heel of the entire data management process. (Figure 3 provides a block
diagram of the fully redundant ROCC Central Computer [Ref. 4].) The main
problem lies in the centralized role the computer plays. In every 12 second
sweep, each radar forwards all of the data detected within its search volume. The
data remains unprocessed until it reaches the computer at the ROCC. With 18
MARs located in Alaska, a vast amount of data must be processed by the
computer. The computer processing time is synchronized with the radar sweep
time of 12 seconds. If the computer is overloaded by too much data, then it
arbitrarily "dumps" data in order to meet the 12 second processing time. Avoiding
overloading the computer was the driving force for the clutter-reducing ECPs









A conflicting sequence of events has occurred: the new radars
produce too much data because of their sensitivity and the location of each
within a high clutter environment; the data from all 18 radars must be processed
by older, slower computers; and the clutter reducing ECPs that were enacted to
avoid computer overload sacrifice the sensitivity that the new radars provide.
C. RADAR DATA MANAGEMENT EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION
Two vendors presented potential solutions to Alaska's radar data
management problems. Litton Data Systems Advanced Tracking System (ATS)
and Sensis Corporations Multi-Scan Correlator Model 2000 (MSC-2000). Both
of these devices work on similar principles, based upon software algorithms
designed to discriminate tracks from clutter.
1. General Description
Each radar data management device is a computer, with the hardware
and software necessary to reduce the amount of clutter caused by environmental
factors, while at same time maintaining a high level of radar detection. The heart
of each device is the tracking algorithm. The specifics of these algorithms are
considered proprietary to each vendor, and will not be addressed here. Generally
speaking, however, the tracking function is performed by an adaptive algorithm.
The algorithm is designed to detect and establish a track within a certain number
of radar scans under varying amounts of search volume, store the track
information in a file, and compare new track information to the existing file. The
track information is kept in the file for a certain number of radar misses before the
track is dropped. In order for the tracking algorithm to be effective, the radar's
search volume is divided into thousands of azimuth and range cells. The tracking
algorithm uses these cells to establish the validity of a track. Once a track is
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established the RDMS sends only the track data back to the ROCC Central
Computer [Ref. 5 and 6].
2. Benefits
One approach to solving the underlying problem in Alaska's radar data
management is decentralized processing of the radar data. The Litton Data
Systems and Sensis Corporation devices focus on this approach, decentralizing
the task of radar data processing. If all 18 radars could preprocess their own raw
data, forwarding only processed track data, it would significantly lessen the
processing burden on the central computer, thus lessening the chances of
overload. Several benefits can be immediately realized:
a. Restoring sensitivity to the radars without fear of overloading the
computer will provide a higher level of operational capability. In the past, low
level radar coverage was limited because it was the source of most clutter. The
ECPs primarily focused on reducing the low level radar beam coverage. But, low
level coverage would not be a problem using the vendor's devices because tracks
could be discriminated from the clutter, and only track data would be passed on
to the command and control computer. Lowering the radar beams would benefit
both missions of the ANR: air defense, including detection of air-to- surface
missiles; and training, which requires maintaining separation of aircraft for the
safe conduct of operations within the training range.
b. The procurement of the next generation ROCC computer could be
delayed. The limitations of the computer processing would be overcome not by
developing a new ROCC computer, but by taking advantage of current computer
technology to provide decentralized processing. A new ROCC computer would
take many years to develop and cost more money than anyone would want to
spend for an air defense command and control system. Research and
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development for the vendor's RDMS is already accomplished—the systems
already exist. The only task would be to ascertain the validity of the claims being
made about these systems and determine which system best solves the radar data
management problems.
c. Integration and interpretability are additional benefits. By reducing
the workload of the central computer, additional radars could be easily integrated
into the existing air defense network. This is especially important because the
range improvement plans call for adding two additional radars. The radars under
consideration are Westinghouse radars developed for the Marines and used to
provide short range, low level radar coverage. Both vendor's RDMS are
interoperable with a wide range of radars. This will provide flexibility when
acquiring additional radars for future expansion of radar coverage. Deployed
radars equipped with an RDMS device would also be able to provide track data
to the ROCC computer for display.
D. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Operational mission constraints and legal ramifications are necessary
background. Special considerations, driven by the operational mission, had to be
accounted for in the planning and execution of the experiment. Whether or not
these factors had a direct effect on the outcome of the experiment is hard to say.
However these factors are worthy of mention. They illustrate the challenges of
conducting experiments in the operational environment. Legal ramifications were
always a topic of utmost importance. The commander emphasized that he did not
want to give the perception that the ll tn AF was in the business of conducting
its own test and evaluation. Additionally, he did not want to give the impression
that he was bypassing the acquisition process. Therefore, he informed all
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involved with this project to make it clear: 1 l tn AF had not gone into business
for itself.
1. Operational mission constraints
The experiments would have to be conducted on a non-interference
basis. The operational missions could not be sacrificed at the expense of the
experiments. This criterion was the ultimate requirement and provided the
boundaries for the experiment. A direct cause and effect relationship can be seen
between the operational mission constraints and variable selection in the
experiment. Furthermore, controlling factors in an operational environment is
much more difficult than in a laboratory.
The 1
1
tn ACW staff wanted to vary certain factors, but was constrained
by operational requirements. The factors that were affected were site selection,
time, and type of radar. Only three sites were allowed as part of the experiment.
Even these sites were subject to being removed if they were needed to fulfill an
operational mission. The effect this had on the experiment was that it was now
limited to the terrain, air traffic volume, and clutter unique to the three areas
selected. This lead to several questions: Is this sample representative of the
Alaskan environment as a whole? Could valid conclusions be drawn for the
entire area of responsibility or just those sections? What about the areas where
the new radars would be used? Since none of the radars selected is located in the
proposed range improvement area, would the conclusions drawn from where the
experiments were conducted be valid there?
Time was also affected by operational constraints. The time of year was
limited to the early winter season. Would this be a representative sample for the
type of traffic volume and clutter seen throughout the entire year? Additionally,
the time of day was limited. The experiment could only be conducted before or
14
after the daily training sorties were flown. This meant either early morning or late
afternoon/early evening. Again, would this represent an environment similar to
one normally seen?
The radars used were a factor that should have been varied but could
not be. Ideally, two different radars should have been examined: the MAR radar
and the Marine short range radar. However, since the Marine radar had not been
procured, only the MAR radar could be examined.
Weather, traffic volume, terrain, and clutter environment are all factors
that the experimenter would like to either control or vary but were literally at the
mercy of the operational constraints. These factors are all functions of the site
selection and time. Therefore, holding them constant or allowing them to vary
was impossible and reflected the difficulty of conducting controlled experiments
in an operational environment.
2. Legal Ramifications
The term "demonstration plan" was used to emphasize the point that
operational units were not in the business of test and evaluation. The 1 l tn AF
was conducting a demonstration of the equipment, at no cost or legal obligation
to the government. Furthermore, the staff was going to examine the data the
vendors collected to verify the claims of the vendors. The llm AF did not want
to give the perception that this unit was bypassing, or undermining, established
acquisition procedures. In fact, the unit did not actively pursue vendors. The
vendors made their own solicitation and offers of demonstration, at no cost to the
government, and these offers were made prior to the range improvement project.
Up until this point, Litton Data Systems was the only vendor known to
have a radar data management device. Not until after completion of the Litton
Demonstration was it learned that there was another vendor that had a similar
15
device and wanted the opportunity to demonstrate it in Alaska. This created a
potential legal problem. If, Sensis Corporation, the other vendor, wanted to
demonstrate their equipment and were turned down, then the government could
face a lawsuit. In order to afford Sensis the same opportunity as Litton, it was
decide that Sensis could demonstrate their equipment. Because of the short
notice of the Sensis demonstration, another Demonstration Plan was not
produced. Instead, the ATS Plan was followed and the results of both
demonstrations were published in the Long Range Radar (LRR) Enhancements
Staff Study.
E. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provided background information and serves as a prelude to the
analysis of the experimental plan and report. The Impetus for Change Section
illustrated why the 1 lm AF felt management of the radar data was important. The
System Description Section detailed the components involved with radar data
management. The shortcomings as well as the potential benefits of installing an
RDMS were elaborated in the Radar Data Management Equipment Section.
Finally, the chapter ended with a discussion of the special considerations and
their affect on the experiment. With the background firmly established, an
analysis of the experiment can be conducted. The experimental plan and report
will be analyzed in Chapter III.
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III. ANALYSIS
This chapter presents an analysis of the Advanced Tracking System (ATS)
Demonstration Plan and the LRR Enhancements Staff Study [Ref. 7 and 8]. From
this point on, the ATS Demonstration Plan will be referred to as the Plan and the
LRR Enhancements Staff Study will be referred to as the Report. The reader is
encouraged to read both the Plan and the Report which can be found in
Appendices B and C. This will aid in understanding the analysis.
The Plan and Report analyses follow a simple format-mistakes are pointed
out followed by potential solutions. An Experiment Plan and Reports Format and
an Evaluation of Studies Paradigm that were presented in the C3 curriculum at
the Naval Postgraduate School were used to analyze both the Plan and the
Report [Ref. 9]. These tools are used to identify mistakes and to provide
guidance for the solutions. The Experiment Plan and Reports Format and the
Evaluation of Studies Paradigm are included as Appendices D and E. At the
conclusion of the analysis, a newly revised Plan is presented that integrates all of
the lessons learned in the Plan analysis (Appendix F). However, there is no newly
revised Report. The main reason is that the data necessary to provide a thorough
analysis is not available; therefore, major sections of the report would be missing.
The Experiment Plan and Reports Format serves as a model of how a plan
and report could be organized and what elements should be contained in the
structures of plans and reports. From this point on, the Experiment Plan and
Reports Format will be known as the model (Appendix D).
The Evaluation of Studies Paradigm (Paradigm) is an essential ingredient in
the analysis because it defines the elements of the model (Appendix E). Together
17
the model and the paradigm provide the framework needed to analyze the Plan
and Report.
A. PLAN ANALYSIS
The ATS Demonstration Plan lacks a clear statement of the purpose of the
experiment. Neither the real world problems that the ATS is intended to solve,
nor how the results of the demonstration will be used to show that it can, are
clearly stated. As a result, the following sections lack foundation. They should
give details about the conduct of the experiment and the analysis of the results,
and show how everything is specifically organized to answer the questions at
hand. Without clear articulation of the problem, this is not possible. Detailed
analysis of each section, as defined in the model, followed by a sample
introductory revision is given below.
1. Mistakes (Introduction)
An experimental plan should be a cohesive document that lays the
foundation for the entire experiment, up to and including the analysis. It should
provide introductory material saying who is performing the experiment, why the
experiment is being performed (purpose), and defining the experimental scope.
This material should clearly identify the real world problem that the experiment
will help solve and the specific questions the experiment seeks to answer.
The major problem with the Plan is its lack of a unified introduction
section containing clearly defined objectives of what the experiment is supposed
to do. The introductory elements that the Plan does contain are scattered
throughout the plan as opposed to being incorporated into a unified introduction
section. For example: the team is introduced in section 2-1; the purpose
statement is found in section 1 - 1 ; and the objectives are found in section 4- 1 . This
creates a lack of focus for the entire experiment.
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The purpose is not fully addressed. There is a purpose statement, but it
is rather weak. The Plan states the". ..demonstration is to determine whether or
not the ATS can be used in the Alaskan Theater to improve radar performance
and make recommendations concerning the desirability of [incorporating] the
ATS in the Alaskan Surveillance and Command and Control System." The
purpose also mentions that the primary objective is to "...collect sufficient data to
determine the ATS's capability for substantially improving the probability of
detecting targets (at lower altitudes and clutter environment)." But, the real
world problem is neither poor radar performance nor low probability of detection.
The actual real world problem is radar data overloading the central computer.
This is not mentioned. Furthermore, there are no specific questions that the
experiment seeks to answer. So naturally, the approach the experiment will use
to answer the research questions is not addressed and neither are the anticipated
results. The scope of the experiment is also not addressed. This section should
explain why this experiment is important to the success of the mission, what
constraints are imposed on the experiment, and what the impact of the
experiment will be.
The stated objectives are not appropriate because they are benefits
rather than objectives, and they do not map back to the primary objective listed in
the purpose statement: to provide evidence as to whether or not the ATS is
capable of improving the probability of detecting low level targets in a high
clutter environment.
Objective one states:
Reduce demands on the FYQ-93 ROCC central computer: processing time
and memory space. At present, central computer processing time and memory
storage space is nearly saturated; while memory storage in the processor
controller is overloaded to the point it "dumps" data.
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Objective three states:
Increase probability of detection by reducing human variability in the
detection/tracking process. The ATS serving as a front end processor at the
radar will automatically detect, establish, and pass target data to the Region
Operations Control Center (ROCC). The presentation of only true targets in
the ROCC will eliminate operator decisions concerning the validity of targets.
This will increase the probability of establishing air tracks. Also because only
true targets are presented, maintaining track continuity will improve for both
computer tracking algorithms and when operators override computer tracking.
Neither one of these are valid objectives. Both of them are benefits that
would result if the ATS works. However, determining the truth of this assumption
is the primary objective of the experiment.
Objective two states:
Radar Enhancement: Regain loss of probability of detection, sacrificed at
the expense of clutter reduction solutions to the radar. With the ATS's ability
to extract true targets from clutter, the radar beam could be lowered thus
increasing the probability of detection of low level targets.
This objective is not appropriate because it is the approach that the
experimenters are taking to test the ATS's capabilities. In order to validate the
manufacture's claims about the ATS, the radar must be allowed to operate in its
fully operational state uninhibited by any ECPs. The purpose is determine the
amount of data being processed by the radar with and without the ATS, and to
determine whether or not the ATS is eliminating valid target data.
Objective four states:
Role of the ATS in Alaska: By analyzing the data collected during the
demonstration, we will draw inferences concerning the utility of the ATS in
Alaskan Theater. Areas of interest: advantages of incorporating the ATS at
each AN/FPS-1 17 in Alaska from a sensor interoperability standpoint; added
measure of safety in large scale exercises.
This objective is neither a benefit nor an approach. Instead objective




The major problem with the Plan is its lack of a unified introduction
section containing clearly defined objectives of what the Plan is supposed to do.
The solution is to create an introduction section that corrects the mistakes. An
example of what the introduction section should look like follows:
I. REVISED INTRODUCTION
A. Project Management
The 1 1 ACW is going to conduct an experiment to assess the
capabilities of the Litton Data Systems Advanced Tracking System
(ATS).
1. In order to manage the demonstration, an Advanced
Tracking System Project Management Team was established. The
demonstration team leader is 1 l tn ACW/DOX; other team members
are listed in paragraph three.
2. The following agencies are participating or providing
support for the ATS demon stration:
a. 11 ACW/DOXXQ -- Capt Pierce
b. 11 ACW/DOP -- SSgtMyher
c. 1 1 ACW/LGOR -- MSgt DeLuca
d. 1 1 ACW/LGKC -- MSgt Shuler
e. 11 ACW/LGKM -- TSgtCushman
f. 744ADS/DOO -- Lt McNeil
g. 21 st TFW/DOW -- Capt Hill
21
B. Purpose
The purpose of this experiment will be to determine whether
or not Litton Data Systems Advanced Tracking System (ATS) is
capable of more efficiently managing the flow of radar data coming
into the Region Operations Control Center (ROCC). Managing the
radar data more efficiently will enable the operators to realize the
full operational capabilities of the new radars without overloading
the ROCC Central Computer. As a result, the demonstration is
designed to provide insight into the radar data management
problems being experienced by the Alaska NORAD Region (ANR)
and the ability of the ATS to solve them. Specifically, the ANR
would like to determine the validity of the claims of the ATS's
capabilities. For example: Can the ATS accurately discriminate true
targets from clutter? From an air defense point of view, can the ATS
provide target discrimination without target elimination?
The demonstration will select three sites, all equipped with
ECPs. All of the ECPs will be turned off for the demonstration in
order to reestablish the radars to a fully sensitized state. The ATS
must prove that it is capable of handling the data workload from a
fully sensitized radar.
The ATS will not be installed at the selected radars because
of the logistics and prohibitive costs. Instead, the ATS equipment
will be installed in the ROCC.
The ATS will be connected at the ROCC Communications
Segment, the point where the data arrives in the ROCC via satellite
from the selected radars. The data arriving at this point has not yet
been processed by the ROCC central computer. Therefore,
connecting the ATS at the ROCC Communications Segment
simulates the ATS processing the data at the radar site.
The next step will be to compare the amount of data a fully
sensitized radar forwards with the amount of data a fully sensitized
radar equipped with an ATS forwards. The ROCC provides the
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capability to simultaneously measure ATS and non-ATS data from
the same site (see Figure 4)[Ref. 10]. The reduction in data, and the
quality of the data must be analyzed simultaneously. The ATS may
live up to its clutter reduction claims, but the data has to be
analyzed to ensure that the ATS is not eliminating or erroneously
manipulating valid air targets necessary for air defense and air
training missions. In order to verify the target data, a specific
number of aircraft, flying different profiles, will be used. The
experiment will be designed to control the number of aircraft.
However, the actual flight profiles along with the number of aircraft
used during the test will only be known by a third party,
disassociated from the experiment. Only after the experiment is
completed and the analysis turned in will the aircraft portion of the
experiment be revealed. The purpose of this single blind design is
to eliminate any bias from the experimenters.
The anticipated results: Measurable differences between the
quantity of data received from a radar in a fully sensitized state,
when equipped with an ATS and when not, are expected.
However, whether or not the ATS eliminates valid air targets










C. The scope of the demonstration:
This demonstration will provide the information the 1 1th AF
Commander needs to decide whether or not the ATS (or other
associated Radar Data Management System) provides viable
solutions to the radar data management problems experienced by
the ANR. There are several potential benefits if the ATS
demonstration proves successful. First, ECPs can be eliminated from
the radars, restoring them to their full operational capability, and
providing greater low level detection of aircraft and missiles. In the
area of training, the improved detection capability will increase the
radar coverage in the low level training areas.
Benefits should also be seen in the ROCC central computer.
Installing the ATS at the radar head will decentralize the computer
processing. The ATS will discriminate between clutter and target
data, dump the clutter data, and pass only the target data to the
central computer for further processing. The main benefits to the
central computer are reductions in the amount of processing
required and the potential for a computer overload that arbitrarily
dumps data.
The reduced computer workload will enable the installation
of additional radars. This is important because PACAF wants to
expand the air training ranges in Alaska. The eruption of Mount
Pinatubo and subsequent loss of a major air training exercise in the
Philippines called Cope Thunder required more training, and thus an
expansion of the air training ranges, in Alaska. As a result,
additional radars are needed to provide coverage in these new
training areas. However, the additional data from these sites could
easily create an overload condition in the computer. Dumping data
during a major exercise would seriously jeopardize the safety of the
entire mission.
The life of the central computer will be prolonged because
the amount of data the central computer has to process will be
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eased. Thus, the costly acquisition of a new generation ROCC
computer can be delayed.
3. Mistakes (Experimental Design)
The details of the experimental design should be included in the plan. It
should explain the experimental setup in detail, including the physical setup, who
the test subjects or experimental units are, what special equipment is required, and
give the trial schedule. The hypotheses that are to be examined should be stated
specifically, as should any assumptions that will be made. The statistical design of
the experiment should be explained, along with definitions of measures that will
be employed and instrumentation that will be used to collect the data. Provisions
should be made for testing the setup and design, and for the trials.
While the Introduction section of the Plan fails to provide the necessary
focus for the experiment, the Experimental Design section suffers from a lack of
detail. The closest the Plan comes to an experimental design is the Procedures
Section, a subsection of the Demonstration Objectives.
The Procedures Section attempts to cover too many details in a single
page of material. Of the five statements listed on page 4-2, only three can be
considered procedures. These three statements, taken from the Plan, are quoted
below:
Three radar sites (Cape Romanzof, Kotzebue, and Tatalina) will be used to
collect data to satisfy objectives one and two (reduce demands on the FYQ-
93 ROCC central computer, and radar enhancement). These sites were
chosen because they possess the latest clutter reducing software (i.e. ECP
175 and the Multiscan Detection Processing (MDP)). At different times each
day, data will be collected from each site for a period of 105 minutes. Each
fifteen minutes, within the data collection window, the radar will be placed
into a different configuration (e.g. ECP 175 enabled and MDP disabled). Data
will be collected via data reduction, later collated on the Site Data Sheets
(figure 1 ) and analyzed.
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Data will be collected using low level flights (if available) in the ACMI
range. This data will be used to assess the ATS'ss ability to enhance the
probability of detection (Pd) of the FPS -117 radar.
A tracking test will be used to meet the third demonstration objective
(increase probability of detection by reducing human variability in the
detection/tracking process). A operator will be selected at random and given
an area of responsibility (AOR) to initiate and maintain track continuity on all
tracks in the AOR. The operator will operate with and without the benefits of
the ATS and all track histories will be recorded via data reduction. A
comparison will be made of the data collected from the data reduction
products to determine whether or not an operator will realize an increased
probability of detection by reducing human variability in the
detection/tracking process. Detailed instructions will be provided to each
surveillance operator by the project coordinator-thus insuring a degree of
procedural standardization.
These three statements seem to try to map back to the original objectives
that were not clearly defined in the first place. But, the result is unsuccessful, and
the reader is left confused as to the specific outcome the procedures are trying to
accomplish. The lack of clearly defined objectives has an adverse effect on how
the experiment is to be conducted. As a result, the reader comes away without a
clear idea as to what problem the experiment is trying to solve.
Another problem is that there are no procedures describing how the
objective of "Reducing the demands on the FYQ-93 ROCC central computer..."
will be accomplished. Is this objective no longer important?
The arbitrary presentation of procedural details further illustrates a lack
of focus in the Plan. Paragraph two states that three sites were selected based
upon the installation of certain ECPs. Why does it matter which ECP is installed
at each radar? Should not one of the main procedures of the experiment be to
disable all of the clutter reducing ECPs? If this is the case, then it should not
matter what kind of ECP is installed at the radar. The procedure suggests that the
experiment is designed to compare the various ECPs located at different radar
sites with the ATS. This procedure does not map back to any of the objectives.
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To further illustrate the arbitrary nature of the procedures, paragraph
two states that data will be collected for a period of 105 minutes, and that every
15 minutes the radar will change to a different ECP configuration. There is no
explanation given why a 105 minute data collection period was chosen.
Furthermore, manipulating the configuration of the ECPs is unnecessary. The
details mentioned in paragraph two only distract and confuse the reader.
Finally, paragraph two mentions that data will be collected via data
reduction and then analyzed. Several questions are not addressed. First, what
kind of data is being collected? How will the researcher know if this data will
provide answers to the research questions if it is not clear what the questions are?
What will the data measure? How will the data be collected? The data will be
collected by data reduction, what does that mean? What instrumentation will be
required to collect this data? What is the plan for analyzing the data after it is
collected? All of these questions, and more, need to be included as details in the
design of the experiment.
Paragraph three states: "Data will be collected using low level flights (if
available) in the ACMI range. This data will be used to assess the [ATS's] ability
to enhance the probability of detection (Pd) of the FPS-1 17 radar." This is what
the experiment is suppose to be about, but, no details are given as to how this will
be carried out. The lack of detail makes the reader wonder whether or not the
experiment will be conducted "on the fly."
Paragraph four is a procedure for another experiment that would
determine whether or not the ATS will increase the probability of detection by
reducing the human variability in the detection/tracking process. This procedure
fails to define details of how the experiment will be executed. For example: the
procedure states: "A[n] operator will be selected at random and given an area of
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responsibility (AOR) to initiate and maintain track continuity on all tracks in the
AOR." What will his performance be compared to? What kind of operator will be
selected? Background information is required here because there are different
types and capabilities of ROCC operators. Furthermore, how will the operators
be selected; based upon what criteria? Again, the issue of what measures will be
used are not addressed. How will the data be collected? What instrumentation
will be used to collect the data? What is the plan for analyzing the data? How
does this experiment provide the evidence necessary to determine the capabilities
of the ATS? Does this experiment focus on the primary objective? Or, is this
experiment an example of how an experiment can get off track because of a lack
of clear objectives?
4. Solutions (Experimental Design)
The experimental design problems are solved by utilizing the concepts
found in the model and the paradigm. According to the paradigm, "the
Experimental Design is comprehensive but executable if it tests all the pertinent
hypotheses with measurable data by a practical analysis plan." In order to
accomplish this task, the model must be used. The revised Experimental Design
section that follows applies both the model and the paradigm and is a direct
extension of the revised Introduction section.
29
H. REVISED EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. Setup:
1. Physical
The physical setup is the crux of the entire experiment. The
demonstration would not be possible if not for the flexibility of the
ROCC system. Figure 4 depicts the actual physical interface
between the ROCC and the ATS equipment. The following is a
discussion of the ROCC-ATS interface.
The digital switch provides the interconnection between the
communication channels from the radar sites and the central
computer. The radar data at the digital switch has not been
processed by the ROCC computer. Each radar sends its data to the
digital switch at the ROCC via three 2.4 kbps communications
channels. These channels feed directly into three ports associated
with each radar at the digital switch. Two ports, designated A and
B, are normally interconnected with the primary and standby central
computers. The third port, designated C, is available for recording
data on a noninterference basis. This is the location of the ROCC-
ATS interface. At the same time, the cable from port B of the Digital
Switch to the central computer will be disconnected at the
computer, and the output from the ATS will be connected to the
standby computer at its input channel (Figure 4).
2. Factors:
There are three experimental factors: radar sites at three
levels; Litton ATS at two levels; and analysis equipment at two
levels. Three radar sites have been chosen: Kotzebue, Cape
Romanzof, and Tatalina (Figure 2). The ATS radar processing
hardware/software is either on or off. Finally, the equipment being
used to analyze the data is either third party, Air Force approved,
test and evaluation equipment or the Litton Data Systems analysis
program associated with the ATS.
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3. Special Equipment:
a. The ATS consists of all of the interface hardware as well as
the software to conduct the data collection and analysis. All will be
provided by Litton Data Systems.
b. A neutral third party will be involved to provide balance
and legitimacy to the experiment. This third party (i.e., 84th Radar
Evaluation Squadron) must conduct the experiment in parallel with
Litton. They must interface at the same location, with the same site,
and at the same time. They will collect the data, analyze it, and
compare their results with Litton's experimental results.
Aircraft will be dedicated to fly certain profiles within the
coverage limits of the selected radar.
4. Schedule of Trials:
The schedule of trials will not be formally addressed in this
sample plan. The driving factor for the schedule of trials will be the
availability of the aircraft needed to fly the flight profiles. Making
up a schedule of trials does not provide sufficient lessons learned.
B. Hypotheses:
la. There is no difference between the amount of data
forwarded by the fully sensitized radar and the radar equipped with
the ATS.
lb. The alternative: There is a difference between the
amount of data forwarded by the fully sensitized radar and the radar
equipped with the ATS.
2a. There is no difference between the number of targets
reported by the ROCC computer combined with the fully sensitized
radar and the radar equipped with an ATS.
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2b. There is a difference between the number of targets
reported by the ROCC computer combined with the fully sensitized
radar and the radar equipped with an ATS.
3a. There is no difference between the third party analysis
results and the Litton Data Systems analysis results.
3b. There is a difference between the third party analysis
results and the Litton Data Systems analysis results.
The first two hypotheses deal with the issues of quantity and
quality of the data the ATS produces. Does the ATS make a
difference in the amount of data being sent back to the ROCC
central computer? And, does the ATS discriminate targets from
clutter without eliminating valid air targets?
The third hypothesis is designed to validate the Litton
demonstration by determining whether or not the data is consistent
with that from an established test and evaluation system. The 1 l tn
ACW staff must be sure that the ATS works as claimed and that the
analysis tools that are part of the equipment package portray the




Litton's interface hardware is compatible with the ROCC
equipment.
2. The software will provide the type of analysis needed to
answer the research questions.
3. The weather patterns and clutter density at the three sites
are representative of the (AOR) overall.
4. Both Litton and the third party Air Force evaluation
equipment is capable of counting and keeping track of the number
of targets received from the radar.
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Note: This assumption is based on the claims of Litton that its
software has the capability to compile this type of information [Ref
.
3]. Additionally, since the ROCC computer, a 1970s version
computer, has the capability to count the number of tracks in the
system, and is certified, it is assumed that the evaluation equipment
exists within the Air Force, or else the ROCC computer could not
have been certified in the first place.
D. Statistical Design of Experiment
The experiment is a 3 X 2 X 2 factorial single blind
experiment. This means that one factor has three levels and the
other two factors each have two levels. The first factor has three
levels because of the selection of three different radar sites. The
radar sites associated with these levels are: Kotzebue, Cape
Romanzof, and Tatalina. This factor corresponds to hypotheses one
and two stated above. The processing equipment is the second
factor. The two levels are whether or not the radar is utilizing the
ATS. This factor also corresponds to hypotheses one and two. The
third factor is analysis equipment. The two levels for this factor are
the third party operationally approved equipment and the Litton
analysis equipment. This factor corresponds to hypothesis number
three. The purpose of designing a single blind experiment is to
eliminate experimenter bias and to serve as a means to evaluate
whether or not the ATS is eliminating valid air targets.
E. Measures
The experiment is designed to evaluate the data forwarded
by the radar. The data will be collected and reduced into two
categories. The first category deals with the quantity of data and
the second deals with the quality of data (target elimination). The
categories of data are listed below.
Category one: Quantity. The total amount of data processed
and sent by the radar to the ROCC, measured in bits per second.
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Category two: Quality. The total number of targets being
sent by the radar to the ROCC, measured by the total number of
targets being sent by the ROCC computer to the operator.
F. Instrumentation
The instrumentation is the equipment used by Litton and
the third party Air Force evaluation team to collect and analyze the
data.
G. Testing & Pilot Trials
Testing will be done to ensure the ATS and third party
equipment can be connected to the ROCC digital switch.
Additional testing will be done to ensure the commander that the
experiment will not interfere with the daily operations of the ROCC.
After the interfaces are made, pilot trials will be run to ensure
that the data being collected is the correct data to test the
hypotheses. The researchers will use the pilot testing to practice the
experimental procedures. For planning purposes, time should be
allotted in the master schedule for the pilot testing.
5. Mistakes (Data Description)
A description of the data should also be included in the plan. This
section of the plan should contain an example of the raw data, (the entire set of
collected data should appear in an appendix) problems experienced with
collecting the data should be addressed, and the data should be presented in an
understandable and easy to read format (i.e., tables or spreadsheets). Any
methods used to reduce the data, or other manipulations, should be explained.
The way the Plan describes the data is another contributing factor to its
overall weakness. The Plan describes the data in a subsection entitled Data
Products. The opening statement: "Data products required to ensure accurate
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analysis." implies that the data collected will answer the research questions being
asked. The analysis of the Experimental Design section revealed that the plan
does not mention how the data will be collected. The lack of measures, coupled
with the fact that no testing and pilot trials are called for in the plan, leads one to
believe that no one would know if the wrong data had been collected until after
the analysis had begun. This is too late to learn that the data collected will not
answer the research questions.
Another problem with the Data Products section is that it states the data
is to be collected from the Aircraft Combat Maneuvering and Instrumentation
Center computer (ACMI) and the ROCC. However, there is no description of the
data that will be collected from these two points. The Plan also mentions that a
log will be maintained at the Air Surveillance Technician position. A log may be
useful to help reconstruct the experiment, but it should be kept by a person
directly involved with the experiment. Furthermore, a log of this nature does not
provide any real data for analysis.
6. Solution (Data Description)
As with the other sections of the Plan, the revised Data Description
Section that follows provides a possible solution based upon the lessons learned
from the mistakes of the original plan and utilizing the model and paradigm.
m. REVISED DATA DESCRIPTION
Table 1 presents the data coding scheme. The table depicts
the three factors (Radar Sites, Analysis Equipment, Processing
Equipment) along with their associated levels. The number in
parenthesis is the code assigned to the particular level. The coding
scheme will become apparent when the table listing the different
combinations of trials is presented below.
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TABLE 1 DATA CODING SCHEME
Radar Sites Analysis Equipment Processing Equipment
Kotzebue ( 1
)
Third Party ( 1
)
Non ATS ( 1
)
CapeRomanzoff(2) Litton (2) ATS (2)
Tatalina (3)
The data is divided into two categories.
Data: Total amount of data received from the radar (X in bits
per second)
Total number of tracks (Y)
The data is divided into two categories to aid in the analysis,
but it will all be collected at once for each trial. The computer
software of the evaluation equipment will reduce the data into the
X and Y categories designated above.
Table 2 depicts the combinations of levels of the factors.
There are twelve combinations of factor levels, found by multiplying
one factor with three levels and two factors each with two levels.
Each of the trials will be replicated thirty times in order to assume
the data approximates a normal distribution.
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TABLE 2 TRIALS
Trial # Radar Sites Analysis Equip. Processing Equip. Data (X) Data (Y)
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 2
3 1 2 1
4 1 2 2
5 2 1 1
6 2 1 • 2
7 2 2 1
8 2 2 2
9 3 1 1
10 3 1 2
11 3 2 1
12 3 2 2
There are a several steps in the data collection process. The first
step is to collect all of the data the radar is sending to the ROCC.
The total amount of data will be used by the analysis to answer
hypotheses one and three. Target counts will then be compiled
using the software capabilities of the computers. The target counts
will be used to answer hypothesis number two. Additionally, the
target count data can be used to provide supplementary information
concerning hypotheses numbers three.
7. Mistakes (Analysis Plan)
A good plan must state how the analysis will be performed (the details
of the analysis belong in the report). The analysis plan must also state the
statistical tests that will be used to analyze the data.
The Plan does not address how the data will be analyzed, only that once
the data is collected it will be analyzed.
37
8. Solutions (Analysis Plan)
The analysis section is the final section of the revised plan. Like the
sections before, the mistakes made in the original plan are overcome by using the
model and the paradigm as a guide.
IV. REVISED ANALYSIS PLAN
Balanced Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) will be used to
analyze the data. The results will determine the outcome of the
hypotheses tests. As indicated in the data section, there are two
parts to the plan. The first section will use the balanced ANOVA to
analyze the total amount of data. Thirty replications of each of the
twelve trials will be made. This will be done to provide normality.
The second phase of the analysis will also use balanced ANOVA,
this time to analyze the thirty replications of target counts.
B. REPORT ANALYSIS
The same analytical tools used to evaluate the ATS Plan will be used to
analyze the Report. The analysis will compare the information in the Report to
what should be included in a report based upon the model and the paradigm. As
with the analysis of the Plan, mistakes are addressed and solutions are presented.
However, a revised Report is not presented because data crucial to the analysis
was not collected or is not available for analysis. Since the entire report revolves
around the Analysis Section, and data is not available to be analyzed, merely
restating what has already been said in the revised Plan and leaving the Analysis
Section out would have little value.
The formal title of the original report is: LRR ENHANCEMENTS STAFF
STUDY . This is the final report to the 1 1th Air Force Commander recommending
a course of action based upon the outcome of the RDMS demonstrations. It is
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interesting to note that only one demonstration plan but two demonstrations are
addressed in the final report.
Two demonstrations were conducted by the 1 1 ACW. First, Litton Data
Systems demonstrated the Advanced Tracking System (ATS). The planning for
this demonstration took an entire year and culminated in the execution of the
ATS Demonstration Plan. After the ATS demonstration and analysis were
complete, Sensis Corporation hearing that their competitor Litton Data Systems
had conducted a demonstration in Alaska, contacted the 1 1 ACW expressing
their desire to demonstrate their equipment. The 1 1 ACW, concerned with the
legal consequences of not letting Sensis Corporation demonstrate their
equipment, allowed a Sensis demonstration. Because of the short time interval
between the Litton and Sensis demonstrations, a plan could not be written,
approved, and disseminated. As result, a Sensis Plan does not exist. The Report is
the first time the Sensis demonstration is mentioned.
1. Mistakes (Introduction)
An Introduction Section of an experimental report is similar to that
already discussed for an experimental plan. This section should introduce the
researchers involved with the experiment, contain a well defined purpose,
including a statement of the real world problem and specific questions the
experiment seeks to answer, the experimental approach, and anticipated results, as
well as the scope of the experiment. In addition, the Introduction Section of the
report should also contain any additional information that may have occurred
during the course of the experiment.
The Report fails the same the way the Plan fails. It does not meet the
requirements of either the model or the paradigm. The Report does not contain a
clearly defined Introduction Section. The analysis of the Plan demonstrated that
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if the Introduction Section failed to state a clear objective the rest of the Plan
suffered because it is too easy to get side tracked from the original purpose of the
experiment.
There is one overarching problem with the Report. There is a shift in the
emphasis from what the Plan set out to accomplish and what the Report is trying
to accomplish. The first sentence in the Report reveals the discontinuity between
the Plan and the Report. The first sentence states: "The 1 lm AF needs to acquire
a system that will integrate existing systems i.e., 3DS [Digital Data Display
System], AICU [Advanced Interface Control Unit], and ACMI [Air Combat
Maneuvering and Instrumentation], into a cohesive, efficient system providing
unseen benefits to the Alaska 2000+ Range Improvements Project" (see Glossary,
Appendix A, for definition of terms). Remember, the Plan was to focus on
validating the claims of Litton Data Systems Advanced Tracking System
capabilities. However, the first statement in the Report clearly indicates a shift to
a different emphasis.
The next area the Report addresses is: Factors Bearing on the Problem.
The first factor (paragraph a) states the requirement for integrating another type
of radar into the ROCC. This is valid requirement. However, isn't this
requirement a benefit? If the Plan and the execution of the experiment had
focused on validating the ATS's capabilities, and the report presented evidence to
support these capabilities, then the RDMS could be considered a viable solution.
The next three factors, also taken from this section, address integration issues
(paragraph b,c,and d) and appear below.
b. Currently, no capability exists to automatically insert flight
data on military aircraft into 3DS. The NORAD Software Support
Facility (NSSF) is working on CSCP [Computer Software Change
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Proposal] # 4569 which would allow the automatic tell of military
aircraft. Hence, creating the pathway needed to get data on military
aircraft into 3DS. The solution the NSSF is trying to achieve is a
major software change: no solution is on the horizon.
c. Track data on aircraft not equipped with ACMI pods, but
still players in large force exercises (LFEs), are not entered into the
ACMI.
d. Radar data on aircraft not equipped with ACMI pods are
detected by LRRs surrounding the range; however, this information
is only sent to the ROCC. The idea here is to provide data on
exercise participants, not capable of being tracked by ACMI, to the
ACMI via the LRR-ROCC/AICU-ACMI interface (see attach. 1).
The results: a more complete, accurate air picture, providing an
added measure of flight safety both to the military and civil sectors.
The statements that there exists an inability to automatically insert flight
plan data as well as track data on aircraft not equipped with ACMI pods into the
3DS is an attempt by the 1 1 ACW to provide evidence to support the RDMS as a
solution. A requirement to automatically fuse data derived from outside C3
systems may exist, but the experiment was not designed to support this question.
Furthermore, no evidence exits in the Report to support this requirement.
The integration issues also address the important safety role the radars
play in keeping track of aircraft not equipped with ACMI pods. Aircraft not
equipped with ACMI pods are not tracked by the ACMI and the radars provide
the only measure of safety. While this is true, and there is a requirement to
integrate this data, the report claims an added measure of safety it can not support
with data obtained by the experiment. The experiment was not designed to
support a flight safety issue. Therefore, conclusions about flight safety can not be
extrapolated from the experiment that was conducted.
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The next factor addressed (paragraph e) is the communications interface
between the ROCC and the radar.
e. The communication interface between the LRR and the
ROCC needs to be made more efficient. At present massive
amounts of radar data, most of it useless clutter is being bulk
encrypted and sent over the communications circuits to the ROCC
(see attach. 2). Sending only true target information, filtered from
the clutter, will reduce the burden on the interface, thereby making
this interface more efficient.
Again, this a valid requirement, but one that is not addressed by the
current Plan. In order to make any claims about how much burden would be
reduced by an RDMS, experiments have to be designed with this question in
mind.
The report states (paragraph f) that one of the factors is: "Too much
useless data is being sent to the ROCC computer for processing. Sending only
data which contains true target information will inherently make the ROCC
computer more efficient." How can this statement be verified from the design of
the experiment put forth in the Plan? Again, a separate experiment must be
conducted if the 1 1 ACW wants to verify these claims.
Human variability is addressed in paragraph (g). The Report says: "A
human variability in the target detection and tracking process exits. " There is no
denying that variability exists between individuals in the tracking process.
Furthermore, it would seem likely that if the RDMS lived up to its capability the
variability in the tracking process could be reduced. However, the Report sites
one of its attachments (see attachment 3 in Appendix D) as supporting evidence
to this claim. This attachment is a view graph of a radar scope demonstrating the
difference in the amount of data between an ATS equipped radar and a non-ATS
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equipped radar as seen from an operator perspective. This view graph does not,
however, support the claim that variability in the tracking process can be
reduced. Visually looking at the differences does not tell the whole story. The
view graph does not provide insight as to how the data is being processed by the
ATS or whether the ATS is eliminating targets of interest (the primary objective of
the Plan). A statistical analysis of the raw data needs to be accomplished
according to a design like that laid out in the new Plan.
The final factor the Report mentions is the need to integrate all of the
stovepipe C2 systems in the theater (paragraph h). The reports says: "Systems,
i.e., AICU, ACMI, CTIS [Commander's Theater Information System]/3DS, need to
be integrated more efficiently. Information available to one system can be made
available to another system. For example: track data the AICU receives from an
LRR can be made available to both 3DS and ACMI." Again, this is clear
evidence of the shift in emphasis between the Plan and the Report. The emphasis
has shifted from validating the ATS's capabilities to using the Range
Improvements Project requirements as a means of justifying the procurement of
the RDMS.
The fifth and final section of the Report is the Discussion Section. The
material mentioned in this section could either be totally eliminated from the
report or included as part of the Introduction Section, providing background.
The general impression of the Discussion Section is that the RDMS is
the "catch all" single solution to all of the Range Improvements Project's
requirements. The introduction paragraph states: "A solution will be offered,
tested against criteria, and shown how this solution will solve the problem." The
report argues that if the RDMS can hold up to the scrutiny of criteria that are
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established for the first time in the Report, then the RDMS must be the a valid
solution.
The entire discussion appears to be a sales pitch to the decision makers
on the importance of the RDMS to the Range Improvements Project. The Report
essentially ignores the original purpose of the demonstration, as stated in the Plan
or otherwise, and argues that the RDMS is the only solution because it meets all
of the criteria the Report established. The Discussion Section makes no attempt
to address the issue of whether or not the claims made by the vendors about their
equipment are valid. The only things offered are excerpts from the contractors
final reports on how great their equipment is and all the reasons the ll tn AF
should buy their equipment. There is no independent, unbiased, scientific
analysis of the data. The only analysis is from the vendors, using their equipment
and their analysis tools.
The 1
1
tn ACW is asked to have faith that the analysis conducted by the
vendors, using their own equipment, is reliable. The demonstration started out
with the stated purpose of determining the validity of the ATS's capabilities and
ended up using the ATS as a solution to an integration problem. This drift can be
traced back to the lack of focus of the Plan, which did not provide a "road map"
that the 11 th ACW staff could follow. This lack of focus lead to a Plan and
Report that lacked credibility and do not provide concrete answers for decision
makers. This is probably why the PACAF has yet to acquire a RDMS for the
Alaskan radars.
2. Solution (Introduction)
The Introduction section in the final report provides information to the
reader of the renort who has not read or had access to the Plan. Therefore,
everything mentioned in the Introduction Section of the revised Plan should be
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included in the final report, plus any additional information revealed during the
experiment.
During the time of the demonstrations, the Alaska 2000+ Range
Improvements Project became a prime interest of the 1 l tn AF commander. The
1 l
tn ACW saw the Range Improvements Project as a funding vehicle for their
RDMS project. The background politics explain the discontinuity between the
Report and the Plan; however, this is not an excuse for allowing a shift in the
problem emphasis. The RDMS project can only suffer. When the focus shifts
back to the RDMS, questions will be asked about the validity of its claimed
capabilities. If both the Plan and Report focused on the questions of validating
RDMS capabilities, then the llm ACW would have strong supporting evidence
for piggybacking on the Range Improvements Project.
3. Mistakes (Experimental Design)
Like the Introduction Section, the Experimental Design Section shares
similarities between the experimental plan and report; the difference is that greater
detail must be included in the report. It should explain the experimental setup
including the physical setup, who the test subjects or experimental units are, what
special equipment is required, and give the trial schedule. The hypotheses that
are to be examined should be stated specifically, as should any assumptions that
will be made. The statistical design of the experiment should be explained, along
with definitions of measures that will be employed and instrumentation that will
be used to collect the data. Provisions should be made for testing the setup and
design, and for the trials.
The Report fails to adequately address the experimental design. The
report contains Assumptions and Criteria Sections that could be considered
elements of the experimental design section. The assumptions deal only with
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integration. The assumptions are: "Industry has the capability to solve the
integration requirements we have established during this study. The AICU will
be able to receive track messages from the RDMS and route these messages back
and forth between the 3DS and ACMI." However, assumptions used to analyze
the data collected from the experiment are not mentioned.
The Criteria Section deals only with requirements that have to be met in
order to provide an adequate solution to the interface problems. Each of the five
criteria are biased towards the RDMS as a solution. The report lists the following
as criteria:
a. The solution must be able to reduce the burden on the LRR-ROCC
interface.
b. The data that's being output is in a format that can be used by the
ROCC computer as well as the AICU.
c. The solution must be able to integrate and interface the AN/TPS-63
radar data in the correct format into the ROCC where it will be routed via the
AICU to the 3DS and ACMI.
d. The system must have an open architecture design, being able to be
incorporated into future systems (ROMS/RAMMS).
e. Versatile user friendly workstations, providing self diagnostics and real
time radar status monitoring, as well as GCI control.
Clearly each of the criteria takes advantage of the proposed benefits
touted by the vendors of the RDMS equipment. Once again, the political
pressures are at work: If the RDMS could meet all of the criteria, how could the
decision makers ignore the RDMS and not allow funding to a system that directly
impacts the Range Improvements Project?
4. Solutions (Experimental Design)
The report should address the experimental design in same manner as
the Plan. The experimental design section tells the reader how the experiment
was carried out. No details should be left out. The report must provide details
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concerning the setup of the experiment, hypotheses must be clearly stated (these
are the specific research questions), assumptions made must be listed, the
statistical design of the experiment must be presented, the issue of what kind of
data was collected, and how it is to be collected, must not be overlooked, and
testing and pilot trials have to be mentioned.
5. Mistakes (Data Description)
This section of the plan should contain an example of the raw data, (the
entire set of collected data should appear in an appendix) problems experienced
with collecting the data should be addressed, and the data should be presented in
an understandable and easy to read format (i.e., tables or spreadsheets). Any
methods used to reduce the data, or other manipulations, should be explained.
The Report does not even mention the data. There is little doubt as to
why the incorrect data was collected because neither the Plan nor the Report was
concerned about data collection.
6. Solution (Data Description)
All of the details described in the revised Plan need to be included in the
final report. As a matter of fact, the report should contain even more detail than
the plan. The report should contain an example of the raw data, and problems the
data should be addressed. All of the data collected should be presented in an
appendix or in an archive.
Readers may want to replicate the experiment to verify the results
claimed in the report. The data coding scheme (an example appears in the revised
Plan) must be included. This will allow the reader to decipher the way the
experimenter coded the data, and it will aid in understanding the analysis. If
possible, and for the sake of clarity, the data should be presented in a tabular
form. If the data is manipulated or reduced in any way, this has to be addressed.
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The bottom line: The data description must be detailed and accurate enough so
that the experiment can be replicated and the results verified.
7. Mistakes (Analysis)
The Analysis section is probably the most important section of the
report. This section should contain a summary of the analysis plan that was
presented in the experimental plan, a detailed methodology of how the analysis
was conducted, the results of the analysis, and any additional assumptions that
were required.
The Report lacks any significant analysis section. No statistical analysis
of the data is accomplished. The view graph attachments at the end of the report
(see Appendix D) are the only things presented as the analysis. Basically, the 1
1
ACW presented the findings of the vendors. No attempt was made, nor was any
data provided, to verify the claims made by the vendors. The problems with the
analysis stem all the way back to the lack of focus and clearly defined objectives
in the Plan and the resulting inability to maintain focus from the inception of the
Plan through its execution.
8. Solution (Analysis)
Data that can provide the answers to specific research questions,
generated from well defined objectives, is a key piece of the solution to the
analysis failure. There are several elements that are essential to the analysis
section. The analysis should contain a summary of the analysis plan presented in
the initial experiment plan. The methodology used to collect the data and how
that data was analyzed must be detailed, and any additional assumptions that the
experimenter made have to be addressed. The results of the analysis are the heart
of the entire experimental process. They results allow conclusions to be drawn
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and recommendations to be made that are objectively based on actual
experimental outcomes.
9. Mistakes (Conclusions)
The Conclusion Section is unique in that it only appears in the
experimental report. This section presents the results of the hypotheses that were
listed in the plan, as well as any other interpretations drawn from the analysis of
the data. These results are then related to the real world problem the experiment
set out to answer. An overall summary of the experiment should also be
presented in this section.
The Report states: "... demonstrations conducted by Litton Data
Systems, Sensis Corp., and GE Syracuse, have clearly shown that industry possess
the capability to meet our established criteria. A RDMS at the LRR would
integrate radar data from both the AN/FPS-117 and AN/TPS-63 [the proposed
Westinghouse radar that would be acquired to enhance radar coverage in the
expanded training areas] radars into the ROCC, 3DS, and ACMI while at the
same time increasing the efficiency of the entire Alaska 2000+ Range network."
First, the 1 1 ACW had little or no involvement with the GE demonstration, so it
will not be addressed in this analysis. Second, the motivation behind the report
was to show how the RDMS equipment could be used to integrate the various
in-theater C2 systems. Clearly a different objective than what was initially
proposed: To verify the claims made by the vendors about their equipment
capabilities. Since the report argues for the integration benefits of the RDMS
equipment, the analysis presented in the attachments is arguing in favor of the
capabilities. In short, the conclusions are not valid. There is no evidence to
support the conclusions being drawn.
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10. Solution (Conclusions)
The main ingredient to solving the problem with the conclusions is
maintaining a constant focus on the objectives of the experiment throughout the
Plan and Report. One approach to achieving this focus is the use of the model
and paradigm. The model contains four elements in the Conclusion Section. The
first element is the hypotheses results, along with the interpretations of these
results. The second element is any other interpretations. Third, and probably the
most important, the real world meaning of the results. Finally, an experimental
summary should be drawn. According to the paradigm, the conclusions are
"...supportable if they are valid results of an analysis that follows logically from
the study."
11. Mistakes (Recommendations)
The report should finish with a Recommendations Section. This section
should contain a discussion of potential changes to the experiment along with
recommendations for further work in this area.
The Report does not contain the elements described above, instead the
Report makes a recommendation in favor of the RDMS. Based upon all of the
analysis of this Report, there is no evidence to support this recommendation.
12. Solutions (Recommendations)
The Recommendations Section of the report, in addition to offering
recommendations, should contain sections dealing with changes to be made to
the experiment. Additionally, the recommendations section should address any
requirement for further work in this area.
13. General Issues
Finally, there are two general issues concerning the overall quality of the
experiment. First, is the issue of simplicity. According to the paradigm, the report
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is "...simple if it is short and illustrative, has a minimum number of assumptions,
alternatives, hypotheses, and measures, plus easily understood analysis and
conclusions." The Report fails to meet the definition of simplicity. While it is
short, the Report fails to illustrate how the experiment was carried out. The
assumptions are not representative of an experiment initially designed to verify
the capabilities of the ATS. Instead of listing specific hypotheses, integration
criteria are listed. Neither measures or an analysis is addressed by the plan. A
marginal attempt at an analysis is made using view graphs. Finally, the
conclusions stated apply to benefits of integration and not about RDMS
capabilities.
The second issue addresses the consistency of the report. "The study is
consistent if there is compatibility in scope and detail at each step. In addition,
direct linkage between the steps must maintain continuity with the objective."
The shift in the objectives between the Plan and Report is evidence the study is
not consistent. There is no continuity between the Plan and the Report.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The ATS Demonstration Plan was analyzed using the Experiment Plan and
Report Formats as a model of how a plan is organized. The Evaluation of Studies
paradigm provided definition to the organizational model. Highlighting the
mistakes of the Plan was only part of the analysis. The next step was to take the
lessons learned from the Plan and apply them to a new hypothetical plan.
The analysis of the Report (known as the LRR STAFF STUDY) focused on
the analysis and recommendations. Like the analysis of the Plan, the Report
analysis utilized the model and paradigm as evaluation tools. The Plan and Report
are similar because most of the material covered in the Plan is summarized in the
Report. Unlike the analysis of the Plan, the analysis of the Report does not
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provide a new Report because data is missing from both Litton and Sensis. The
missing data can not simply be made up in order to complete an analysis
consistent with the new Plan.
The analysis reveals many mistakes in both the Plan and Report. However,
many lessons can be learned from this experience. These lessons have been
applied in the creation of a new Plan. Furthermore, generic lessons, applicable to
experiments and experimenters, are found in Chapter IV.
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IV. LESSSONS LEARNED
Specific lessons can be learned by studying the Plan and Report described in
this thesis. The analysis chapter illustrated many mistakes that can be made
during an experiment. This chapter takes the specific mistakes made during the
RDMS experiments and creates a list of lessons learned. Additionally, the lessons
the author (who was a major player in the original experiment) learned are listed
and are applicable to experiments in general Hopefully, these lessons learned may
serve as a guide to staff officers that have little experience in conducting
experiments but are tasked to conduct an experiment in an operational
environment.
A. SPECIFIC LESSONS LEARNED
Experimental plans and reports have specific roles. The plan describes in
detail how the experiment will be executed. The report describes the execution
of the experiment, providing an analysis, drawing conclusions and making
recommendations. The lessons described in this section all relate to specific
mistakes identified in the Plan and the Report.
1. Clearly Defined Objectives
Clearly defined objectives are a must. They provide the foundation
upon which the entire experiment is based. For example, the objectives defined in
the experimental plan provide the focus for the entire experiment. Without this
focus the researchers may find it very difficult, if not impossible, to carry out a
successful experiment.
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2. State the Purpose
State the purpose of the experiment, preferably in an Introduction
Section, both in the plan and in the final report. The purpose should describe the
real world problem the experiment is trying to solve along with specific questions
the experiment seeks to answer. This is important because it helps to maintain the
focus for the experiment. After this groundwork is laid, a description of the
approach the researchers will use to try and solve the problem must be addressed.
Finally, to help build a common mental picture of what the experiment hopes to
achieve, there should be a statement about the anticipated results of the
experiment.
3. Define the Scope of the Experiment
The importance of this experiment, why the experiment is being
conducted, and what impact will it have, constraints placed on the conduct of the
experiment, and boundaries on the applicability of the results, should be spelled
out in a section that describes the scope of the experiment.
4. Provide a Detailed Experimental Design
The experimental design is the heart of the plan. This section should
provide the details of how the experiment is to be executed. It should be detailed
enough so that when the experiment is verified it can be replicated.
5. Provide a Data Description
What kind of data is going to be collected and used for analysis? Will
an analysis of the data provide answers to the questions being asked? These
questions must be answered prior to the start of the actual experimental trials.
The researcher must know what kind of data is being collected and whether or
not it will be useful.
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6. Prepare an Analysis Plan
After the data is collected, it must be analyzed. To prevent bias in the
analysis, and to ensure that the right data is collected, the researcher must have a
plan of how the data will be analyzed. While the analysis plan is stated in the
experimental plan, the actual analysis and results are the crux of the final report.
7. Conduct Testing and Pilot Trials
A preferred method of determining whether or not the correct data will
be collected during the experiment is by conducting testing and pilot trials prior
to the actual execution of the experiment. Testing and pilot trials prior to the start
of the ll tn ACW experiments would have determined that the data being
collected was incomplete and would not adequately provide for an analysis that
would yield insights as to the capabilities of the RDMSs.
8. State Supportable Conclusions
The results of the analysis should answer the specific questions being
asked. The conclusions must be supported by the results of the analysis.
9. Make Sound Recommendations Based Upon Analysis of the Data
The recommendations that are made should be supported by data
collected through the execution of the experiment and not by circumstantial
evidence.
B. GENERALIZED LESSONS LEARNED
The generalized lessons learned are subjective lessons the author developed
during the course of this thesis. These lessons, hopefully, will serve as a guide to
those staff officers with little background in experimentation, but are nonetheless
called upon to conduct experiments in an operational environment.
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1. Ask Questions
Can experiments be conducted in an operational environment?
What will the operational impact be if the experiment is conducted?
Will the operational mission adversely affect the experiment?
Will experiments conducted in the operational arena yield useful results?
Should commander involve the staff to conduct these experiments?
Is the staff knowledgeable enough to undertake this task? Or will outside
assistance be required?
2. Gather Knowledge Base
Ensure knowledge exits within the staff to conduct such an experiment.
If necessary seek help from other sources. Maybe even have some other unit or
agency come in and conduct the experiment. This will alleviate any bias the
home staff may have towards the experiment. Two views existed: one favoring
the ATS equipment, and one wanting no part of the equipment. Interestingly, the
lines of opposing opinions were drawn between operations and maintenance
staffs. The operations staff wanted to see the ATS equipment incorporated while
the maintenance staff wanted to continue on with the current ECP fixes.
3. Be Open Minded, Yet Remain Cynical
Don't get locked into one solution and fail to seek other viable options.
Be cynical, ask hard questions. Don't be impressed with "bells and whistles."
Seek proof of claims from independent sources.
4. A Good Plan is a Must
A good plan must have clearly defined objectives. These objectives are
then broken down into questions the plan will be designed to answer.
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5. Keep Research Questions Simple
Keep research questions simple and in line with operational constraints.
Trying to solve complicated research questions in a constrained operational
environment may prove to be too difficult and best left to the laboratory. Break
the complicated research question down into smaller pieces.
6. Pilot Trials are Essential
Pilot trials ensure the data collected will provide answers to the
questions being asked. Ensure the data is replaceable.
7. Keep Detailed Notes
Trying to remember of the details of an experiment is an impossible task
unless detailed notes are kept.
8. Do Not be Afraid to Modify the Experiment
If the pilot trials indicate flaws with the experiment, change whatever
you need to change. Objectives may have to be modified. Whatever the case, do
not be afraid to admit mistakes. The important thing is to correct the mistakes
before the actual trials begin. Time and money are precious commodities. If
mistakes remain undiscovered or overlooked, rerunning the entire experiment
may not be feasible.
9. Use the Right Statistical Tool for the Right Job
Using certain statistical tools requires different assumptions to be made.
Using the wrong tool seriously undermines the conclusions drawn from the
analysis.
10. Report Results in a Clear, Concise, and Simple Format
Do not attempt to give a technical brief to a commander and his staff.
You could quickly find yourself out in the hall. If, by chance you are allowed to
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proceed, you run the risk of creating a great deal of confusion and seriously
jeopardizing an credibility of your office.
11. Present Only the Facts, Don't Speculate
When asked to report the results of your analysis report only the results.
If you do not have the answer say so and do not interject personal opinions.
Doing so only clouds the results of the experiment.
12. Be Careful About Extrapolating Results to Other Situations
This lesson is a corollary of the above lesson. There is an overwhelming
urge to extrapolate the results of experiments to other areas of interest. Care must
be taken. The results of the experiment are for a certain set of conditions.
Extrapolating results of an experiment to a different set of conditions without
further research is not wise. In other words, stay within the scope of the
experiment.
13. Ensure Consistency Between the Plan and the Report
The conclusions presented in the final report should be consistent with
the primary objective stated originally in the plan. If, for some reason the
objectives of the experiment change, then the plan should reflect the changes
prior to conducting the experiment.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The data collected could not provide the answers to the primary questions,
and that analysis of the Plan and Report revealed several weaknesses which no
doubt contributed to this failure. A summary of the deficiencies is given in the
following paragraphs.
The overarching problem with the Plan was that it failed to clearly define the
objectives of the experiment. This resulted in a lack of a clearly defined purpose.
As a result, the Plan constantly strayed from the primary objective: verifying the
ATS's capabilities.
The Plan also failed to provide a detailed description of the experimental
design. As it is presented, the Plan does not describe how the experiment will be
conducted to verify the ATS's capabilities. This resulted in procedures calling for
experiments that did not relate to the primary objective.
The lack of a clearly defined data description resulted in an inability to
conduct a thorough analysis. The Plan states that data will be collected and then
analyzed. However, there is no description of the data, how it will be collected, or
any testing done to determine whether or not the data is the correct data needed
for the analysis. The analysis could not be conducted because insufficient data
was collected.
The Plan also lacks an analysis section. There is no mention as to how the
data will be analyzed. The result is seen in the Report where the analysis uses
subjective arguments to support certain criteria and view graphs showing the
benefits in reducing the amount of data being sent by the radars.
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The lack of clear objectives also plagued the Report. As a result, the entire
emphasis of the Report shifted from verifying RDMS equipment capabilities to
integrating other in-theater C3 systems.
The Report lacked any significant analysis. Instead of analyzing collected
data to test the validity of the ATS, a set of criteria, not previously discussed, was
presented. The analysis consisted of examining whether or not the RDMS
equipment would meet the criteria. As a result, little if any, information could be
gleaned from the analysis.
The conclusions presented in the Report were not supported by a statistical
analysis from data collected during the experiment. Instead, the Report presents
view graphs providing a visual representation of the RDMS equipment
capabilities. The result is that there are still questions about the validity of the
RDMS and its capabilities. The conclusions seemed to be based upon
circumstantial evidence not on evidence provided by the analysis data collected
during the experiment.
The final result of the Plan and Report is a positive endorsement of the
RDMS as a solution to the radar data management problems found in Alaska.
However, based upon the analysis, the recommendations made in the Report are
of doubtful validity.
The model used in this thesis is an accepted evaluation tool. There is no
requirement that all experimental plans and reports follow this model; but, it is the
opinion of this author that the Plan and Report failed partly as a result of not
following a model such as the one taught at the Naval Postgraduate School.
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze an actual experimental plan and
report and provide lessons learned. The entire experimental process, starting with
the plan development and proceeding through the publication of the final report,
lasted approximately two years. The motivation behind this thesis was to
illustrate the difficulties involved with experimentation. Compounding these
difficulties is the fact that this author, who was in charge of the experiment,
lacked the proper training needed to carry out an experiment successfully.
However, after attending the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and studying the
correct way to conduct an experiment, this author decided to use the lessons
learned at NPS to analyze what was done two years before.
Chapter II provided background stating the motivating factors behind the
experiment. Chapter III is the heart of the thesis. This chapter analyzed the ATS
Demonstration Plan and the LRR Enhancements Staff Study. Mistakes were
pointed out and solutions were offered based upon the Experiment Plan and
Report Format as well as the Evaluation of Studies paradigm presented in the
Joint Command and Control and Communications curriculum offered at the Naval
Postgraduate School. Chapter IV provided the lessons learned from the
experiment. The purpose of this chapter was to provide a guide to those staff
officers who have little experience in experimental design and analysis but are
nonetheless tasked to conduct an experiment in an operational environment.
Hopefully, the lessons learned may serve as a guide so that these staff officers can
provide reliable recommendations to decision makers.
Further work needs to be done to determine the validity of the RDMS.
Experiments need to be conducted that determine whether or not the RDMS
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device is eliminating data on targets vital to air defense and air combat training.
After this is determined, questions of integrating this system into current C3
architectures can be addressed.
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ACMI stands for Aircraft Combat Maneuvering and Instrumentation. The
ACMI was initially designed as a training device for fighter pilots. The ACMI
provides a three dimensional view of aircraft in relation to its environment
providing lessons learned for mistakes made in flight.
AICU
AICU stands for Advanced Interface Control Unit. This system is designed as
a translator and router of data. The purpose of the AICU is to serve as a main
point where data from different sensors can be interchanged. Data from different
sensors utilizing one type of protocol can be exchanged with data of other
sensors utilizing a different protocol. For example, data from a Radar
Management device located at a radar can be sent to the AICU translated into an
appropriate protocol so the data can be displayed on the 3DS as well as on the
radar consoles of the ROCC.
CTIS/3DS
CTIS/3DS stands for Commander's Theater Information System/Digital Data
Display System. CTIS is a network of computers designed to collect and fuse
data. The fused data is then displayed using a large screen display. The computer




Ground Control Intercept. Air weapons control officers station in a ground
based radar unit with the task of controlling aircraft.
LRR
Long range radars. In Alaska the LRR is the AN/FPS-117 Minimally
Attended Radar.
Plot
Data necessary to describe a point in space. A two dimensional view (X and
Y axes)
Target
Consists of more than one plot. Gives the third dimension. Associated data:
Heading, Speed, Altitude. A direction can be determined from a series of plots
called a target.
Track
A track is a target with alphanumeric data (symbology) attached. The
symbology can either be manually or computer derived. Tracks are established
by a radar operator who determines whether or not a target represents a valid
aircraft. The operator has a direct involvement in the decision making process.
ROMS/RAMMS
Remote operational maintenance system designed to provide long distance
status monitoring of the radar.
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APPENDIX B
ADVANCED TRACKING SYSTEM DEMONSTRATION PLAN
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Forwarded herewith is the Advanced Tracking System Demonstration Plan, 1
Oct 91 . This demonstration is being conducted at the direction of 1 1 AF/CC.
2. This plan outlines those actions necessary to demonstrate the capabilities and
utility of the Advanced Tracking System in the Alaskan Theater.
3. This plan is designed to demonstrate the operational capabilities of the
Advanced Tracking System as part of the current Alaskan Surveillance and
Command and Control System. Of particular interest will be the Automatic
Tracking System's ability to reduce demands on the ROCCs central computer (
processing time and memory space), restore the FPS-117, Long Range Radar,
performance to its original operational specifications for target detection, and to
reduce human variability in the detection and tracking process. The
demonstration will take place from 7 Oct 91 to 18 Oct 91 . The equipment will be
located in the ROCC in order to take advantage of the existing communications
circuits feeding radar data from the Long Range Radars (LRRs) to the ROCC
computer. Locating the ATS in the ROCC will allow access to any radar without
the logistics of transporting people and equipment to remote sites and make the
equipment available for maximum visibility.
GEORGE A. PAHLS, Colonel, USAF 1 Atch




1. PURPOSE: To outline responsibilities and procedures for the Advanced
Tracking System Demonstration of 7 Oct- 1 8 Oct 91
.
2. CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION: This project plan will be the basis
of the Advanced Tracking System Demonstration. It will be implemented at the
direction of the 1 1 TCW/DO.
3. OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED:
a. Forces Assigned. All tasked units will respond when this plan is executed
unless specifically excused by the implementing authority.
b. Supporting Plans. Not required.
4. OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC): In the execution of this plan, OPSEC
must be a matter of continuing concern in order to minimize disclosure of
sensitive information. Since operations may reveal limitations of the Automatic
Tracking System, the AN/FPS-1 17 Long Range Radar, and the ROCC AN/FYQ-
93 computer, activity must be conducted so as to preclude inadvertent disclosure
of sensitive and/or classified information.
5. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: Normal.

















1. The stated purpose of the demonstration is determine whether or not the ATS
can be used in the Alaskan Theater to improve radar performance and make
recommendations concerning the desirability of incorporation the ATS in the
Alaskan Surveillance and Command and Control System. The primary objective
is to collect sufficient data to determine the ATS' capability for substantially
improving the probability of detecting targets (at lower altitudes and clutter
environment). The ATS, by sending only true target data to the ROCC computer,
could reduce the amount of data the computer has to process. A significant
reduction of data will reduce the demands on computer processing time and
memory/storage space; both of which are nearly saturated.
1-1
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1. In order to manage the demonstration, an Advanced Tracking System Project
Management Team was established. The demonstration team leader is 1
1
TCW/DOX; other team members are listed in paragraph 3.
2. The charter of the project management team is to: set the demonstration
objectives; develop evaluation criteria; conduct and observe demonstrations,
record data on the results of the demonstration; evaluate the potential
application of the ATS; and publish a project report.
3. The following agencies are participating or providing support for the ATS
demonstration:
a. 1 1 TCW/DOXXQ -- Capt Pierce
b. 11TCW/DOP - SSgtMyher
c. 1 1 TCW/LGOR -- MSgt DeLuca
d. 11TCW/LGKC -- MSgtShuler
e. 11TCW/LGKM -- TSgtCushman
f
.
744 ADS/DOO -- Lt McNeil




1. The AN/GYQ -51, Advanced Tracking System, manufactured by Litton Data
Systems is a state of the art tracking system, providing sensor interoperability
between centralized, decentralized, and autonomous air surveillance systems. The
ATS is a front end processor located at the radar, intelligently filtering true targets
from clutter and sending only actual track data to the command center for
display. This capability allows larger volumes of actual track data to be
transmitted over communications channels without resorting to desensitizing or
blanking of the radar.
2. The ATS functions by detecting, establishing, and displaying tracks without
operator intervention. The ATS accomplishes these functions through a four step
process:
a. considers all radar returns via scan to scan processing;
b. identifies true targets;
c. establishes tracks using true targets; and





There are four objectives of the demonstration. The overall purpose of each is to
show how the Alaskan Theater's surveillance and command and control




Reduce demands on the FYQ-93 ROCC central computer; processing time and
memory space. At present, central computer processing time and memory storage
space is nearly saturated; while memory storage in the processor controller is
overloaded to the point it "dumps" data.
2. Radar Enhancement: Regain loss of probability of detection, sacrificed at the
expense of clutter reduction solutions to the radar. With the ATS's ability to
extract true targets from clutter, the radar beam could be lowered thus increasing
the probability of detection of low level targets.
3. Increase probability of detection by reducing human variability in the
detection/tracking process. The ATS serving as a front end processor at the radar
will automatically detect, establish, and pass target data to the Region Operations
Control Center (ROCC). The presentation of only true targets in the ROCC will
eliminate operator decisions concerning the validity of targets. This will increase
the probability of establishing air tracks. Also because only true targets are
presented, maintaining track continuity will improve for both computer tracking
algorithms and when operators override computer tracking.
4. Role of the ATS in Alaska: By analyzing the data collected during the
demonstration, we will draw inferences concerning the utility of the ATS in
Alaskan Theater. Areas of interest: advantages of incorporating the ATS at each
AN/FPS-1 17 in Alaska from a sensor interoperability standpoint; added measure






The following procedures serve as a guide to ensure successful completion of
the four objectives for the demonstration.
2. Three radar sites (Cape Romanzof, Kotzebue, and Tatalina) will be used to
collect data to satisfy objectives one and two (reduce demands on the FYQ-93
ROCC central computer, and radar enhancement). These sites were chosen
because they possess the latest clutter reducing software (i.e. ECP 175 and the
Multiscan Detection Processing (MDP)). At different times each day, data will be
collected from each site for a period of 105 minutes. Each fifteen minutes, within
the data collection window, the radar will be placed into a different configuration
(e.g. ECP 175 enabled and MDP disabled). Data will be collected via data
reduction, later collated on the Site Data Sheets (figure 1) and analyzed.
3. Data will be collected using low level flights (if available) in the ACMI range.
This data will be used to assess the ATS's ability to enhance the probability of
detection (Pd) of the
FPS -117 radar.
4. A tracking test will be used to meet the third demonstration objective (increase
probability of detection by reducing human variability in the detection/tracking
process). A operator will be selected at random and given an area of
responsibility (AOR) to initiate and maintain track continuity on all tracks in the
AOR. The operator will operate with and without the benefits of the ATS and all
track histories will be recorded via data reduction. A comparison will be made of
the data collected from the data reduction products to determine whether or not
an operator will realize an increased probability of detection by reducing human
variability in the detection/tracking process. Detailed instructions will be
provided to each surveillance operator by the project coordinator—thus insuring a
degree of procedural standardization.
5. In order to meet objective four, the potential role of the ATS in Alaska,




TOE ATO IMIMDNSTOATODN L<QNG
The purpose of the ATS Demonstration Log is to ensure accurate and timely
recording of data during the demonstration.





1 . ECP 175 (Anomalous Propagation) activated (beam raised or
lowered).
2. MDP "ON" or "OFF".
3. Data count without the ATS (search only).
4. Data count without the ATS (SIF only).
5. Total data count without the ATS (Search and SIF).
6. Data count with the ATS (search only).
7. Data count with the ATS (SIF only).
8. Total data count with the ATS (Search and SIF).
9. Number of tracks without the ATS.
10. Number of tracks with the ATS.
e. ACMI data for comparison.
f. Record of ROCC track histories for comparison, data reduction.
4-3
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Data products required to ensure accurate analysis.
1. ATS demonstration log. This log will be maintained at the Air Surveillance
Technician position.
2. Data reduction, hard copy print out of flights within the ACMI. Flights will
be recorded on tapes located at the ACMI. During playback, at the ACMI, hard
copies of flight data will be made.
3. Data reduction from the FYQ-93 (ROCC) computer will be accomplished by










(If needed, attach additional sheets)
Corrective Action:





The Personnel Familiarization Forms document equipment familiarization received
by the Litton Data System representatives.





HDATTA AUTOMATODN OTIP3W1T IREQUJESTT
The Data Automation Support Request form enclosed is a form developed and














Work space ROCC USAF
ROCC computer Data for ATS USAF
5-1
81
AIWANCM) TTIRACIKIING OTSTOM IDKMKOHSTmATniON THIMIE
JUME
1 OCT 91
Time: TBD ATS and TDC equipment arrives to the Region Operations Control
Center (ROCC).
2-4 OCT 91
0900- ? Installation and check out of ATS equipment.
7-9 OCT 91
Litton Data Systems representatives will conduct demonstrations of the ATS and
providing familiarization to USAF personnel.
10 OCT 91
0800- ? From this time forward, until the end of the demonstration, data will be
collected from various radar sites at random times. This process will be
accomplished solely by USAF personnel who have received familiarization on 7-9
Oct 91.
17 OCT 91
1700 Demonstration end: Data will be collected, compiled, analyzed, with results




1 . (U) General : This section provides guidance for the planning and conduct of
the ATS demonstration.
2. (U) The denial of protected information to an opposing force is a command
responsibility. All commands and individuals associated with any aspect of
planning, support, or execution of the ATS demonstration plan will safeguard
operational information in accordance with the guide that follows.



































Litton Data Systems 2
HARRY J. KEELING, Col, USAF
Commander, 11 Tactical Control Wing
OFFICIAL
GEORGE A. PAHLS, Colonel, USAF
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FROM: 1 1 OPG/DOXXQ
6900 9THSTSTE301
ELMENDORFAFB AK 99506-2270
SUBJECT: LRR ENHANCEMENTS STAFF STUDY
TO:
PROBLEM
1. The 11 AF needs to acquire a system that will integrate existing systems i.e., 3DS,
AICU, and ACMI, into a cohesive, efficient system, providing unseen benefits to the
Alaska 2000+ Range Improvements Project.
Note: A large proportion of the attachments for this staff study come from the after
action reports of Litton Data Systems and Sensis Corporation—copied with their
permission.
FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. Facts.
a. Radar data from the AN/TPS - 63 must be integrated into the ROCC. The benefits
from the additional radar coverage provided by the TPS-63's needs to be disseminated
and utilized to the fullest extent possible.
b. Currently, no capability exists to automatically insert flight data on military aircraft
into 3DS. The NORAD Software Support Facility (NSSF) is working on CSCP # 4569
which would allow the automatic tell of military aircraft. Hence, creating the pathway
needed to get data on military aircraft into 3DS. The solution the NSSF is trying to
achieve is a major software change: no solution is on the horizon.
c. Track data on aircraft not equipped with ACMI pods, but still players in large force
exercises (LFEs), are not entered into the ACMI.
d. Radar data on aircraft not equipped with ACMI pods are detected by LRRs
surrounding the range; however, this information is only sent to the ROCC. The idea
here is to provide data on exercise participants, not capable of being tracked by ACMI,
to the ACMI via the LRR-ROCC/AICU-ACMI interface (see atch. 1). The results: a
more complete, accurate air picture, providing an added measure of flight safety both to
the military and civil sectors.
e. The communication interface between the LRR and the ROCC needs to be made
more efficient. At present massive amounts of radar data, most of it useless clutter is
being bulk encrypted and sent over the communications circuits to the ROCC (see atch.
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2). Sending only true target information, filtered from the clutter, will reduce the burden
on the interface, thereby making this interface more efficient.
f. Too much useless data is being sent to the ROCC computer for processing.
Sending only data which contains true target information will inherently make the
ROCC computer more efficient. Some of the benefits are: free up available memory,
decrease the amount of stuff the computer has to process, create greater processor
flexibility, redistribute the processing workload between PPC-A and PPC-B.
g. A human variability in the target detection and tracking process exists. Increased
reliability of the radar data, see mostly true targets vise mostly false targets, overall air
surveillance function of the ROCC more reliable and efficient (atch 3).
h. Systems, i.e., AICU, ACMI, CTIS/3DS, need to be integrated more efficiently.
Information available to one system can be made available to another system. For
example: track data the AICU receives from an LRR can be made available to both 3DS
and ACMI.
3. ASSUMPTIONS.
a. Industry has the capability to solve the integration requirements we have
established during this study.
b. The AICU will be able to receive track messages from the RDMS and route these
messages back and forth between the 3DS and ACMI.
4. CRITERIA.
a. The solution must be able to reduce the burden on the LRR-ROCC interface.
b. The data that's being output is in a format that can be used by the ROCC
computer as well as the AICU.
c. The solution must be able to integrate and interface the AN/TPS-63 radar data in
the correct format into the ROCC where it will be routed via the AICU to the 3DS and
ACMI.
e. The system must have an open architecture design, being able to be incorporated
into future systems (i.e., ROMS/RAMMS).
f. Versatile user friendly workstations, providing self diagnostics and real time radar
status monitoring, as well as GCI control.
88
DISCUSSION.
5. The discussion will take a look at how the Alaska 2000+ Range Improvements
Project can made more efficient and solve some problems that has been plaguing Alaska
for years. A solution will be offered, tested against criteria, and shown how this solution
will solve the problem.
a. The last several years have seen the proliferation of stand alone systems. A
common thread runs through the purpose of acquiring these systems: feed the large
screen display, essential for making timely and accurate command and control decisions.
With the shift in emphasis in missions in Alaska, from war time preparedness, needed in
the cold war, to providing a premier training center for the entire military, these stand
alone systems must be flexible enough to meet our needs. The purpose of this study was
to see if there is a way of integrating these stand alone systems into a cohesive network,
not only for the benefit of the large screen display for the battle commanders, but for all.
b. The 1 1 ACW calls the solution a Radar Data Management System (RDMS) (atch
1). The RDMS is installed at the radar site, and its function is to manage the data coming
out of the radar sites. A closer examination of the RDMS and how it stacks up to our
criteria will show the value the RDMS will have in the Alaska 2000+ Range
Improvements Project.
c. Reduce the burden on the LRR-ROCC interface is the first criteria the RDMS must
be measured against. The burden on the LRR-ROCC interface is the quantity of data
having to be transmitted over communications circuits. Most of the data transmitted is
useless—meaning clutter. The RDMS at the radar will contain software that will
intelligently discriminate between true targets and false targets or clutter.
Demonstrations by Litton Data Systems and Sensis Corporation equally illustrated the
dramatic affect of having a RDMS system at the radar site (see atch 4 & 5).
d. Sending quality data to the ROCC from the LRR is a great first step. The next
step is to ensure the data that's being output is in a format that can be used by the
ROCC computer as well as the AICU. The ROCC computer accepts only plot
messages;whereas, the AICU accepts only track messages. Again, experience from
contractor demonstrations has shown there are systems available that output data in
more than one format. Such is the case with Litton's Advanced Tracking System, and
Sensis Corporation's Multi-scan Correlator (MSC 2000) (atch 6 & 7). In atch 1, notice
the RDMS will output plot messages to the Q-93 computer, while at the same time
outputting track messages to the AICU.
e. Sending track messages to the AICU allows several things to happen. First, all
aircraft detected by the radar, sent via track message to the AICU, can then be routed
directly to 3DS. The interface will solve a long standing problem of how to get aircraft,
especially military aircraft, automatically into 3DS for display. Second, track messages
can also be routed by the AICU to the ACMI. The advantages this provides is all
aircraft on the ACMI ranges not equipped with pods can still be displayed on the
ACMI. For example, B-l's from a CONUS base fly a strike mission on the range during
Cope Thunder. In the past, these aircraft would not even be seen on the ACMI;
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although, they are players. The integration of the RDMS track message to the AICU to
the ACMI will provide a more accurate and realistic picture. By virtue of being able to
"see" these types of players, adds an extra measure of safety for both the military and
civilian aviators. Finally, with the same track messages going to 3DS and the ACMI, an
automatically updated picture can be seen by viewers of the ACMI and the 3DS.
Recording and playback capability is the essential point here. Debriefings can occur
simultaneously at geographically separated units. Litton and Sensis both output radai
plot and track messages making integration possible today (atch 8).
f. Integrate the AN/TPS-63 radar into the ROCC is another important criteria. By
having the TPS-63 radars on the Yukon ranges, will provide low level radar coverage
never before seen. However, if the data from this radar doesn't go anywhere, the
benefits will never fully be realized. Putting a RDMS in the TPS-63 will enable radai
plot messages to be sent to the ROCC computer for display and radar track messages to
be received by the AICU and routed to the ACMI and 3DS. Increased low level
coverage, where none previously existed, increased flight safety, increased GCI
awareness, large screen and ACMI display of low level non podded targets are all
advantages of having an RDMS at the TPS-63. Both Litton Data Systems and Sensis
Corporation indicate their systems can be used to integrate the TPS-63 into the ROCC
(atch 9 & 10).
g. The RDMS must be a system with an open architecture design, being able to
incorporate future systems (atch 11). The first "new" system is already becoming a
reality with the installation this year of the Remote Operator Maintenance System
(ROMS).
h. Versatile user friendly workstations are a necessity. The RDMS must have a
workstation (located at the ROCC) with the versatility of being used to monitor the
status of the radar on a real time basis. On the other hand, these workstations must have
the flexibility to be used for either GCI control, or as a recording and playback station.
The RDMS must have recording and playback features essential to training. Again, both
Litton and Sensis have demonstrated workstations that could be used (atch 12 &13).
CONCLUSION.
6. An RDMS meeting the all the criteria providing benefits to the Alaska 2000+ Range
Improvements Project does not exist, not yet, anyway. However, demonstrations
conducted by Litton Data Systems, Sensis Corp., and GE Syracuse, have clearly shown
that industry possesses the capability to meet our established criteria. A RDMS at the
LRR would integrate radar data from both the AN/FPS-1 17 and ANATPS-63 radars into
the ROCC, 3DS, and ACMI while at the same time increasing the efficiency of the entire
Alaska 2000+ Range network.
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ACTION RECOMMENDED.
7. Procure a device, such as a RDMS, located at the LRR, which will provide the radar
data management capabilities as described above.
GEORGE A. PAHLS, Colonel, USAF
Vice Commander
13 Atch
1. RDMS Integration Scheme
2. Radar Data Output Comparison Bar Graph
3. Radar Scope Comparison Data
4. Analytical Data: From Litton Data Systems Final Rpt
5. Analytical Data: Sensis Corp. From Final Rpt
6. Litton data, stating plot and track message output
7. Sensis data, stating correct message formats
8. Sensis data, integration capability with CTIS
9. Sensis data, integration capability with TPS-63
10. Litton Data Systems ltr, integration with TPS-63
11. Sensis Corp. stating open architecture design
12. Sensis Corp. statements on workstations rec/play
13. Litton statement on workstations, record/playback
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RADAR DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (RDMS) INTEGRATION SCHEME
LRR FPS 117/TPS 63
PLOT DATA
RDMS = RADAR DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
AICU = ADVANCED INTERFACE CONTROL UNIT
ACMI = AIR COMBAT MANEUVERING INSTRUMENTATION







































































































































































































































Atachment 3 Radar Scope Comparison Data
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Figure 1-la. Accumulation of all Target Reports from Kotzebue
Radar, June 1991 - Large Concentration of Clutter Reports from Ice
Floes and Other Sources Makes Manual Track Initiation Difficult.

























































Figure 1-lb. Accumulation of all Target Reports from Kotzebue Radar
as Output by ATS, June 1991 - Most Clutter Reports from Ice Floes
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Figure l-2a. Number of all Target Reports Output by Kotzebue Radar
Each Radar Scan, June 1991 - The ASO Must Make Air Target Decision
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Figure l-2b. Number of all Kotzebue Radar Target Reports Output Each
Radar Scan by ATS, June 1991 - The Number of Target Reports for Which
ASO Must Make Air Target Decision Has Been Reduced from 109 to 13
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Figure l-3a. Accumulation of all Radar Search Target Reports from
Kotzebue Radar, June 1991 - Removal of IFF Target Reports Gives a
Representation of Clutter


























































Figure l-3b. Accumulation of all Radar Search Target Reports from
Kotzebue Radar Output by ATS, June 1991 - There Were Few True
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Figure l-4a. Number of Kotzebue Radar Search Reports Output Each
Radar Scan, June 1991 - Removal of IFF Targets Reduces the Number of




































Figure l-4b. Number of Kotzebue Radar Search Reports Output
Radar Scan by ATS, June 1991 - Three of These Reports Are Due
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Figure l-7a. ATS Track of F-15 Air Interceptor (Intruder), Tatalina
Radar Site, October 1991 - The ATS Maintained Track Even During
Rapid 180 Degree Heading Changes
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Figure l-7b. ATS Track of F-15 Air Interceptor (Defender), Tatalina
Radar Site, October 1991 - The ATS Maintained Track for all Except
One Radar Scan Even During Rapid 180 Degree Heading Changes
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3. DEMONSTRATION DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
3.1 False Alarm Rejection Performance
Captain Pierce supervised the connection of the MSC and the collection of data from
four AN/FPS-117 sites: Tatalina, Tin City, Kotzebue, and Cape Romanzoff. Radar
output data was collected from each site for a period of approximately 20 minutes
for the purpose of determining the false alarm rejection capability of the MSC. The
collected data was analyzed off-line using Data Analysis and Display Software
(DADS) previously developed by Sensis. A summary of the false alarm rejection
results is presented in Tables 3.1. through 3.3
Table 3. 1 False Alarm Rejection of the MSC on FPS- 1 17 Radars
Primary Radar Reports



















Table 3.2 False Alarm Rejection of the MSC on a 2D Radar
Primary Radar Reports
Radar Site MSC Input MSC Output
False Alarm
Rejection Ratio
Kenai .6,595 236 28tol
Table 3.3 Comparison of the MDP AND MSC
Primary Radar Reports
Radar Site MDP Output MSC Output
False Alarm
Rejection Ratio
Tin City 933 25 37.3 to 1
The DADS program was also configured to display all scans of the recorded data
(approximately 100) for each site. Once the data File playback had been completed,
the screen dump feature of the DADS program was used. This enabled the user to
"take a snapshot" of the display and transfer the output to a laser printer where a hard
copy is printed. The diamond-shaped symbols with a plus sign in the center
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Tin City Data with MDP On and MSC On.
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AN/GYO-51 Advanced Tracking System (ATS)
A High Performance Extractor/Tracker
for Improved Air Surveillance
INTRODUCTION
The AN/GYQ-51 Advanced Tracking' System (ATS) is a post processor with radar
beacon target extractor and tracker capabilities to significantly improve air
surveillance effectiveness. The ATS has many advanced design features that
distinguish it from conventional extractor equipments to provide improved small
target detection in clutter. Its embedded adaptive tracker automatically
creates and maintains a target track file which facilitates interoperability;
with systems requiring filtered plot or track data inputs . These include fixed
site Operations Centers (SOCCs/ROCCs) and mobile systems like the AN/TYQ-23
Modular Control Equipment (MCE) . ATS has been rigorously evaluated and tested
by the USAF and selected exclusively as the discriminator/tracker for the TAC
AN/TPS-43E and AN/TPS-75 radars used with the USAF MCE, and with the USAF
aerostat radar program. It is also presently employed in the U.S. Customs
Service Southwest Tethered Aerostat (STAS) Program. Requirements have been
established for 56 additional USAF units, 18 USCS units, 1 ROKAF unit, with
emerging requirements for 28-30 more ATSs. As such, the AN/GYQ-51, Advanced
Tracking System, has become the USAF and USCS standard post processor/advanced
tracker.
Recent live ATS Demonstrations in Alaska (with the General Electric AN/FPS-117)
and High Rock, Bahamas (with the Westinghouse TPS-63) prove its adaptability to
interface with a wide variety of older and new-generation radar, systems.
IMPROVED DETECTION AND FALSE ALARM PERFORMANCE
The ATS upgrades air surveillance system performance to improve overall mission
effectiveness. The ATS improves radar detection performance by allowing radar
detection processing to operate at maximum sensitivity and applying post
detection integration in the tracker to extract true targets from the
background plot noise. The radar and target extractor within the ATS operate
to achieve optimum small target (low RCS) detection by accepting all the
radar's plots, then allowing the tracker to perform track-before-detect
processing by applying multi-scan integration. This process uses all available
plot data to determine the presence of true targets from amid clutter in the
surveillance volume.
Employing this two stage detection process allows the ATS to achieve optimum
detection performance without sacrificing false alarm performance.
Conventional extractors do not employ post detection integration and
consequently compromise small target detection to preserve an acceptable false
alarm rate. Most of that conventional false alarm reduction is accomplished
through "fixes" to the radar (e.g. sector blanking, raising the elevation beam
angle, raising the sensitivity level) . These fixes do reduce clutter in the
affected area, but at the price of not detecting all of the real aircraft. The
ATS achieves its improved detection performance without these radar fixes,




In applications of the ATS with the FPS-117, the radar continues to perform all
the target extraction functions. The ATS receives the radar's plot data via
the message output channels. The FPS-117 does not produce the conventional
radar video that would allow the ATS to perform the plot extraction process (as
with the TPS-63) . Instead the ATS extractor is by-passed and the plot data
from the radar is processed by the tracker in the very same way it processes
internally generated plot data. However, the FPS-117 plot extraction function
should be optimized for maximum sensitivity and probability of detection (PD)
,
with none of the frequent fixes which reduce false alarms, but also reduce the
opportunity to detect real aircraft as well.
Noisy Area Tracking
The ATS advanced tracker uses adaptive noisy area tracking techniques and
automatic target discrimination to determine the presence of true targets and
reject false alarms. The objective is to preserve the optimum PD achieved in
the extractor, and eliminate false alarms to an acceptably low level at the
output of the ATS system. Plot data from the extractor function is
automatically processed by the high capacity, high performance adaptive
tracking function within the ATS. Noisy area track initiation is performed on
all input data. The target behavior model defines the envelope of target
dynamics that meet the true target criteria used by the multi-scan track
initiation process. It is through this process that the true targets are
discriminated from the background false plots.
The track initiation function is capable of rejecting large numbers of false
plots in the process of testing all possible plot combinations for true target
characteristics. Typically, many thousands of trial tracks are created and
tested in performing this operation. Most are rejected as combinations of
false plots that exhibited brief periods of true target behavior. With few
exceptions, only true targets in the surveillance volume become established ATS
tracks. Once those tracks are established for the true targets, the
established tracks are used as the target true reference to automatically
discriminate plots from the radar extractor (i.e., sort out the noise and
clutter) . The resulting output consists of the true targets and very few false
reports.
Automatic Target Discrimination
Based on the measured false plot density within individual surveillance
regions, the ATS determines the eligibility of plot for output to the
Operations Center. In clear areas (receiver noise only)
,
plots are output
without discrimination, as the likelihood of plots being true targets in these
clutter free regions is high. In those areas where the false plot density
indicates a noisy region, plots must correlate with established tracks to be
output by the ATS. Beacon plots and their reinforcing radar returns are always
output without discrimination. This plot filter criteria is therefore an
intelligent selection process based on measured noise levels and established
target tracks. This differs significantly from the conventional, totally
censored clutter areas where target detection goes to zero. This capability
has been demonstrated as crucial in meeting PD and false alarm performance
requirements in the latest generation radar applications. Detection and false
alarm rate requirements are such that post detection processing is the only
workable solution for eliminating the false plots created by highly sensitive
radar systems (e.q. FPS-117s and AerostatsK
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INTEROPERABILITY
The ATS has proven essential in providing a high PD and low false alarm plot
input to Operations Centers for a variety of radars. The SOCCs/ROCCs for
example, are not tolerant of false alarms, as is true of many similar centers.
Their central processors can handle no more than 10 to 15 false alarm plots per
scan per radar, in order to successfully process all of the system's radar
data. Otherwise, communications links from the remote radars to the SOCC/ROCC
become overloaded, and/or the Q-93 computer system's processing capacity
becomes stressed and slowed, creating significant operational degradation, or
prompting implementation of those radar fixes which "unplug" or "sector-out"
entire sections of the regional surveillance volume. The ATS's capabilities to
reduce clutter at the radar site , while increasing PD over true targets, has




The ATS is a proven, high performance post-processor/advanced tracker that
improves surveillance performance to meet small, low flying target PD
reguirements . By the use of automatic and adaptive extraction and tracking,
the ATS enhances radar performance for small target detection and false plot
control. The ATS is particularly effective in high clutter environments caused
by weather, birds, sea state, topography and even ECM. The ATS also provides a
local target track file at the radar to support automatic track data tell to
Operations Centers, offering substantial improvement in maintaining continuity
of operations with a distributed target data base.
The ATS is now accepted as a fielded necessity for detection and tracking in
many early warning/air surveillance environments, achieving here-to-fore
unobtainable automation of the surveillance function.
February 1992
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• Captured "pictures" of the ASD and printed hard copies on a laser jet printer.
• Successfully decoded the "ROCC Status" message in real-time and displayed
the results in man-readable textual format on the ASD.
• Successfully generated real-time measures of radar performance such as:
message counts per scan; parity errors (per channel); bad or unrecognized
messages; beacon reinforcement rate; primary reinforcement rate; and track
quality.
• Successfully recorded radar data for two sites simultaneously and played the
data back for post-mission analysis in either Plan Position Indicator (PPI) or
Range-Height Indicator (RHI) format.
• Provided numerous ASD features including zoom, offset, reorigin, track
blocks, track vectors, tabular displays, SIF locate, and continuously updated
range and bearing calculations.
• Using Sensis developed "Data Analysis and Display Software" (DADS),
successfully displayed and analyzed recorded radar data.
• Rejected false alarms far better than the MDP algorithm implemented within
the DDP — the MSC further reduced the false alarm rate out of the MDP on the
AN/FPS- 1 17 at Tin City by a factor of 39.6 to 1.
The important operational capabilities which Sensis can provide in a singularly cost-
effective way include:
• Enhancing range-safety throughout the Yukon MOA by optimizing the
performance of the AN/FPS- 117s and the AN/TPS-63 via a two step process:
one, increasing radar sensitivity at low elevations and through valleys by
proper selection of detection thresholds, STC attenuation and elevation beam
pointing angles; and two, employing MSCs to effectively control false alarms.
• Integrating ROCC track information into the CTIS network by developing a
special interface board (a derivative of the UNIO™ board within the MSC)
which taps into the data stream broadcast from the Display Controller to the
HMD-22(J) console.
• Providing radar plot and track data on an Ethernet LAN where it can be picked
off and processed by new "open architecture" data processors and displays
without interfering with current ROCC operation. The key to this realizing this
capability is to put MSCs at the radar sites to reduce the amount of plot data
(by eliminating false alarms) to the point that the track data also available'from
the MSCs can be added and transmitted to the ROCC over existing data links.
By presenting data and supportive discussion, the following report sections
substantiate the assertions made here relative to the level of demonstrated
performance and the potential for improved operational capability. Estimates of the
cost and schedule of several specific programs proposed to enhance the ROCCs
operational capability are also included.
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• Captured "pictures" of the ASD and printed hard copies on a laser jet printer.
• Successfully decoded the "ROCC Status" message in real-time and displayed
the results in man-readable textual format on the ASD.
• Successfully generated real-time measures of radar performance such as:
message counts per scan; parity errors (per channel); bad or unrecognized
messages; beacon reinforcement rate; primary reinforcement rate; and track
quality.
• Successfully recorded radar data for two sites simultaneously and played the
data back for post-mission analysis in either Plan Position Indicator (PPI) or
Range-Height Indicator (RHI) format.
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• Provided numerous ASD features including zoom, offset, reorigin, track
blocks, track vectors, tabular displays, SEF locate, and continuously updated
range and bearing calculations.
• Using Sensis developed "Data Analysis and Display Software" (DADS),
successfully displayed and analyzed recorded radar data.
• Rejected false alarms far better than the MDP algorithm implemented within
the DDP — the MSC further reduced the false alarm rate out of the MDP on the
AN/FPS-1 17 at Tin City by a factor of 39.6 to 1.
The important operational capabilities which Sensis can provide in a singularly cost-
effective way include:
• Enhancing range-safety throughout the Yukon MOA by optimizing the
performance of the AN/FPS-1 17s and the AN/TPS-63 via a two step process:
one, increasing radar sensitivity at low elevations and through valleys by
proper selection of detection thresholds, STC attenuation and elevation beam
pointing angles; and two, employing MSCs to effectively control false alarms.
• Integrating ROCC track information into the CI IS network by developing a
special interface board (a derivative of the UNIO™ board within the MSC)
which taps into the data stream broadcast from the Display Controller to the
HMD-22(J) console .
• Providing radar plot and track data on an Ethernet LAN where it can be picked
off and processed by new "open architecture" data processors and displays
without interfering with current ROCC operation. The key to this realizing this
capability is to put MSCs at the radar sites to reduce the amount of plot data
(by eliminating false alarms) to the point that the track data also availablc'from
the MSCs can be added and transmitted to the ROCC over existing data links.
By presenting data and supportive discussion, the following report sections
substantiate the assertions made here relative to die level of demonstrated
performance and the potential for improved operational capability. Estimates of the
cost and schedule of several specific programs proposed to enhance the ROCCs
operational capability are also included.
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4.2 AN/TPS-63 Improvement
The key to improving the performance of the AN-TPS-63 is simply to reduce the
number of false alarms it generates through the use of the MSC. Our conservative
estimate is that the MSC will reduce the AN/TPS-63's false alarm rate by more than
10 to 1. This judgment reflects the performance which the MSC achieved on the
ARSR-3 at Kenai (i.e., a 28 to 1 false alarm rejection ratio) and our experience with
an aerostat-borne AN/TPS-63 in Yuma Arizona. The MSC cut the false alarm rate
out of the Yuma radar by 15 to 1, and because the moving aerostat has line-of-sight
to a great deal of vehicular traffic, the problem is far more difficult. An example of
the performance witnessed on the Yuma AN/TPS-63 is provided in Figures 4.8 and
4.9. They indicate the multi-scan search-only outputs at the input and output of the
MSC, respectively.
Two unique interfaces are available to handle AN/TPS-63 plot outputs. The USMC
radar utilizes an NTDS parallel interface and other versions utilize a three channel
serial output format. Sensis has experience with both interfaces. The MSC has the
demonstrated capability to accept NTDS format messages, perform false alarm
rejection processing and output the data over two serial, synchronous data channels
in the ROCC standard message format. It also has the demonstrated capability to
accept data from the aerostat borne radar over three serial channels, perform false
alarm rejection processing and output the data (with no data loss) over two serial,
synchronous data channels in the ROCC standard format.
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11th Tactical Control Wing/DOX
6900 9th Street, Suite #301
EJmendorf AFB, AK 99506
Dear Captain Pierce:
Enclosed find the requested Advanced Tracking System (ATS) specification
information. It contains detailed ATS specification data on applicable
government documents/Mil-Standards, system and functional characteristics,
logistics and reliability, and basic Quality Assurance/Verification Test
provisions
.
The ATS is a military nomenclatured system, the AN/GYQ-51, which has been in
successful field use by the Air Force, U.S. Customs Service and Air National
Guard for several years. In addition, new ATS systems have recently been
delivered to Raytheon Corporation for use in the Warner Robins AFB PAVE PAWS
program, to the Korean Navy Tactical Data System (KNTDS) and to General
Electric for the HYPAR program in Turkey. Fourteen more systems are in
production at this time for a variety of other customers, including NORAD.
The continuing success and reliability of ATS stems from Litton's extensive
history of providing state-of-the-art, automatic target detection and tracking
equipments to interface with various search radars and IFF sets. Between
1979-85, Radar Beacon Digitizers (RBDs) were delivered for diverse military and
civil applications in Iceland, Ft. Huachuca, several Navy FACFACs, Berlin's
Tempelhof airport, and the USMC's Marine Air Traffic Control and Landing System
(MATCAIS) . Litton's newest tracker, the ATS, began development in 1981, and
led to the MCE Interface Group (MIG) which performs stand-alone target
extraction and advanced tracking for the Air Force's MCE system. The latest
ATS version, commonly referred to as "STAS" (for the Southwest Tethered
Aerostat program) , is the most highly refined automatic tracker available.
It is important to note that, for potential Alaskan applications, the ATS
interfaces with a variety of radars other than the FPS-117. That includes full
interoperability with the TPS-63 or ARSR-3 series radars, not to mention
tactical radars that may deploy to the theater.






A block diagram of the MSC hardware configuration employed in the demonstration































Figure 2.1 Demonstration Hardware Configuration
Both units were placed on top of the Digital Switch located in the ROCC computer
room. The MSCs were connected to serial maintenance ports of the digital switch
through standard DB25 cables. Data processed and filtered by the MSCs was
transmitted onto an Ethernet Local Aicn Network (LAN) using TCP/IP protocol.
The cable was laid under the floor to a SUN SPARCstation display and control
terminal placed next to a ROCC Radar Display Unit (RJDU).
Within 30 minutes after being unpacked, and with no hardware adjustments or
modifications, the MSC equipment was properly set up and processing live radar
data. The setup was accomplished without interrupting or, in any way, interfering
with system operation. Jumper wires were used to connect the radar data and clock
to the appropriate input and output pins on the MSC.
2.1 Multi-Scan Correlator
The MSC is a commercially available, in-production processor which reduces clutter
induced false target reports without materially reducing target detectability. In fact,
the significant reduction in false alarms realized by the MSC peimits an increase in
radar sensitivity, which can actually increase target detectability. The hardware
consists of COTS sub-assemblies with the exception of one digital board which was
specifically designed to efficiently handle a variety of serial synchronous and
asynchronous message formats. It utilizes industry standards such as the VERTX
real-time operating system, a VME bus interface, an Ethernet LAN, a RETMA
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chassis and a TAF standard SUN workstation. Display and processing code is
written in "C", a High Order Language (HOL).
The MSC is placed between the radar and communications modem, and performs the
correlation processing required to elinunate reports from reflectors which don't move
like true air targets. Returns which are eliminated this way include surface and
volumetric clutter, long-range clutter induced by anomalous propagation (AP), and
slow-moving targets such as vehicular traffic, birds and shipping vessels, Beacon
and search-reinforced beacon returns are tracked internally but not removed from the
data stream. The MSC is capable of handling up to 1600 reports per 12 second scan
(twice the current data link capacity). A more detailed description of the hardware
and software of the MSC is found in Appendix A.
Physically, the MSC is housed in a standard 19" RETMA rack mount chassis, 5
inches high and 24 inches deep. The chassis contains an internal power supply, two
fans, an MVME 147-1 68030 processor board and a serial interface board. The
weight is less than 20 pounds and the power consumption is less than 150 Watts.
2.2 Ethernet LAN
All control communications and data transfer between the MSCs and the SUN
workstation is accomplished via the Ethernet LAN. The modular nature of the
system interface provides the capability to network several units together to obtain as
many input ports as necessary. The bandwidth of the Ethernet LAN, 1 Megabit per
second, is sufficient to accept radar inputs from over 100 sources at 4800 PPS. All
of the incoming radar data is broadcast on the Ethernet LAN where it is available to
be distributed to other non-proprietary computer systems which may be used in the
future.
2.3 SUN SPARCstation
The SUN SPARCstation is a high performance processor with a high resolution
display and built-in mass storage capability. The SUN utilizes the UNIX operating
system and windowing to provide an efficient and convenient method for defining
and generating displays and controls.
The Display and Control system implementation makes use of a keyboard and mouse
or trackball for operator entry and selection of display information. Radar data and
operator entries can be recorded and stored on the 300 Megabyte hard disk and
transferred to magnetic tape for data archiving.
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2. DEMONSTRATION CONFIGURATION
A block diagram of the MSC hardware configuration employed in the demonstration
is shown in Figure 2.1. As shown therein, two MSCs were used simultaneously.






























Figure 2.1 Demonstration Hardware Configuration
Both units were placed on top of the Digital Switch located in the ROCC computer
room. The MSCs were connected to serial maintenance ports of the digital switch
through standard DB25 cables. Data processed and filtered by the MSCs was
transmitted onto an Ethernet Local Area Network (LAN) using TCP/IP protocol.
The cable was laid under the floor to a SUN SPARCstation display and control
terminal placed next to a ROCC Radar Display Unit (RDU).
Within 30 minutes after being unpacked, and with no hardware adjustments or
modificadons, the MSC equipment was properly set up and processing live radar
data. The setup was accomplished without internipung or, in any way, interfering
with system operation. Jumper wires were used to connect the radar data and clock
to the appropriate input and output pins on the MSC.
2.1 Multi-Scan Correlator
The MSC is a commercially available, in-production processor which reduces clutter
induced false target reports without materially reducing target detectability. In fact,
the significant reduction in false alarms realized by die MSC permits an increase in
radar sensitivity, which can actually increase target detectability. The hardware
consists of COTS sub-assemblies with the exception of one digital board which was
specifically designed to efficiently handle a variety of serial synchronous and
asynchronous message formats. It utilizes industry standards such as the VERTX
real-time operating system, a VME bus interface, an Ethernet LAN, a RETMA
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chassis and a TAP standard SUN workstation. Display and processing code is
written in "C", a High Order Language (HOL).
The MSC is placed between the radar and communications modem, and performs the
correlation processing required to eliminate reports from reflectors which don't move
like true air targets. Returns which arc eliminated this way include surface and
volumetric clutter, long-range clutter induced by anomalous propagation (AP), and
slow-moving targets such as vehicular traffic, birds and shipping vessels, Beacon
and search-reinforced beacon returns are tracked internally but not removed from the
data stream. The MSC is capable of handling up to 1600 reports per 12 second scan
(twice the current data link capacity). A more detailed description of the hardware
and software of the MSC is found in Appendix A.
Physically, the MSC is housed in a standard 19" RETMA rack mount chassis, 5
inches high and 24 inches deep. The chassis contains an internal power supply, two
fans, an MVME 147-1 68030 processor board and a serial interface board. The
weight is less than 20 pounds and the power consumption is less than 150 Watts.
2,2 Ethernet LAN
All control communications and data transfer between the MSCs and the SUN
workstation is accomplished via the Ethernet LAN. The modular nature of the
system interface provides the capability to network several units together to obtain as
many input ports as necessary. The bandwidth of the Ethernet LAN, 1 Megabit per
second, is sufficient to accept radar inputs from over 100 sources at 4800 PPS. All
of the incoming radar data is broadcast on the Ethernet JLAN where it is available to
be distributed to other non-proprietary computer systems which may be used in the
future.
2.3 SUN SPARCstation
The SUN SPARCstation is a high performance processor with a high resolution
display and built-in mass storage capability. The SUN utilizes the UNDC operating
system and windowing to provide an efficient and convenient method for defining
and generating displays and controls.
The Display and Control system implementation makes use of a keyboard and mouse
or trackball for operator entry and selection of display information. Radar data and
operator entries can be recorded and stored on the 300 Megabyte hard disk and
transferred to magnetic tape for data archiving.
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9,4 Recording and Playback Capability
The Display and Control station will permit the user to record the received data on
the SUN SPARC workstations internal hard disk memory unit and playback the data
under operator control, in an operator designated file, assuming recording is enabled.
The SUN workstation is equipped with a 300 megabyte internal hard disk drive with
a 150 Megabyte back-up magnetic tape drive for recording and archiving data. The
Display Station can be utilized to record data from multiple radars simultaneously
.for later replay and analysis . Additional display stations can be added as
requirements arise and one of the Display Stations could subsume the functions of
the present RDU with a full color high resolution display.
The playback of previously recorded radar messages is also contulled via the
Display and Control Station. The operator has the capability to specify the playback
filename and to control the rate of playback. Hie rate of playback can be varied
from a real-time rate to approximately 10 times the real-time rate. This feature is
useful for viewing data files to search for specific characteristics or events, fn
addition, the file playback may be paused and restarted under operator control.
9.5 System Features Sin : unary
In summary, the MSC offers the following features to the user:
Modular Architecture: supports single-site remote installations or networking
of multiple MSCs at the C3T Ccn er
Programmable "Universal" Interface Processor: provides transparent
connection with existing data link protocols and the capability to perform
channel data conversions through re-bauding and/or channel muxing
Non-Volatile Storage of Site-Specific Parameters: for automatic self-activation
upon power-up
On-Line Control: permits user selection of certain parameters such as active
and bypass regions, velocity gates and clutter maps
Embedded Ethernet Local Area Network (LAN) Port: provides a common
communication path for growth options including the CMC-2 subsystem and
the networking of multiple MSCs
Equipment Status: via built-in-test with front-panel indicators and status report
messages to the CMC-2
On-Line Performance Monitoring: performs real-time performance monitoring
and health assessment with fault logging and automatic bypass in the event of
a detected fault
Tracker Data Analysis System (TDAS)
The TDAS Is a PC-based program for recording and analyzing ATS output data.
Provisions are made for recording of (1) the raw plot extracted data, (2) the
filtered plot reports generated by the ATS, and (3) the ATS track file as
output to users who require Established tracks rather than filtered plots.
TDAS is also used for analyzing recorded data and presenting the analyzed data,
for display. Provisions are made for hard copy printout of displayed data.
In the Alaska ATS Demo, TDAS was used for generation of all the data
presentations for this report.
A few of the TDAS capabilities pertinent to the ATS demonstration, and
subsequent data analysis, are listed here:
1. Generate a geoposltional display of radar target reports, filtered
target reports or tracks. This display has most of the capabilities of
the normal radar PPI display including radar centered display, display
offset to cursor (ball tab) position, and range scale variation.
Provisions for data retention for any number of radar scans is provided.
Provisions are also made for stepping through recorded data one radar
scan at a time (with data retention for as many radar scans as the
operator chooses), clearing of the display, and continuation of the
process. Hard copy printouts can be made at any step in the process.
2. Generation of scan sequence diagrams which present data values for each
individual radar scan (up to 250 radar scans on a single display). Up
to four scan- sequence diagrams can be generated at one time. Values of
any track or plot parameter output by the ATS can be displayed.
Examples are
:
a. The number of target reports output by the Target Detector each radar
scan.
b. The number of plot reports output by the ATS each radar scan.
c. The number of tracks output by the ATS each radar scan.
d. Speed, heading, height and track quality for any ATS output track.
3
.
Generation of histograms of data maintained in the ATS track file and
output by the ATS plot filter . For example, the distribution of tracks
with speeds In 25 mph speed intervals for speeds from zero to 500 mph.
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APPENDIX D
EXPERIMENT PLAN AND REPORT FORMATS
GENERAL: Ideally, an experiment is reported on in two documents, an
experimental plan that lays the foundation, and an experimental report that tells
what actually took place and what the results were. For CC4003 we do not
have time to produce elaborate experimental plans, so we move some of the
information into the report. The following outline is suggested. Parenthetical
notes identify information that could be in the plan, the report, or both.
1. Introduction (plan - summarize in report)
A. Introduce the team
B. Purpose
(1) The real world problem the experiment will help solve
(2) The specific questions the experiment seeks to answer
(3) The approach
(4) Anticipated Results
C. Scope of Experiment





(4) Schedule of Trials
B. Hypotheses
C. Assumptions




G. Testing & Pilot Trials
3. Data Description (both: plan -- what will be collected, assumptions;
report — details)
A. Example of raw data
B. Data problems
C. Data coding scheme
D. Data table
E. Data Reduction
4. Analysis (both: plan — how it will be performed; report - details)
A. Analysis Plan (plan — summarize in report)
B. Methodology (report)
C. Results of Analysis (report)
D. Any additional assumptions that were required (report)
5. Conclusions (report)
A. Hypotheses Results -- Interpretations
B. Other Interpretations
C. Real world meaning of results
D. Experiment Summary
6. Recommendations (report)
A. Changes to the experiment
B. Continuation of the Experiment
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APPENDIX E
EVALUATION OF STUDIES PARADIGM
Evaluating Studies
CC4003--January 1994
Simple short, graphic, minimum
OBJECTIVE clear & relevant easy to understand,
unambiguous, appropriate
ASSUMPTIONS reasonable logical, realistic, sensible,
minimum






















DEFINITIONS OF CHARACTERISTICS-EVALUATION PARADIGM
The objective is clear and relevant if it is easy to understand, unambiguous
and appropriate to the goal of the study.
The study is simple if it is short and illustrative , has a minimum number of
assumptions, alternatives, hypotheses and measures plus easily understood
analysis and conclusions.
The assumptions are reasonable if they can be supported logically,
realistically and sensibly . They should be the minimum necessary to limit the
scope of the problem to viable choices.
The experimental design is comprehensive but executable if it tests all the
pertinent hypotheses with measurable data by a practical analysis plan.
A hypothesis is germane if its test efficiently accomplishes the objective of
the study.
Measures are quantifiable if they provide numerical values that accurately
reflect the alternatives. The are discriminating if significant differences in then-
values reflect important differences in the alternatives.
Data is replicable if it is precisely defined and accurately measured and
processed. A test of replicability is if repeated trials would produce the same data.
An analysis is correct if it carefully tests data with statistically sound methods.
It is unbiased if the assumptions and methods applied reflect reality.
The conclusions are supportable if they are valid results of an analysis that
follows logically from the study.
The study is consistent if there is compatibility in scope and detail at each








The 1 1 ACW is going to conduct an experiment to assess the capabilities of
the Litton Data Systems Advanced Tracking System (ATS).
1. In order to manage the demonstration, an Advanced Tracking System
Project Management Team was established. The demonstration team leader is
1 lm ACW/DOX; other team members are listed in paragraph three.
2. The following agencies are participating or providing support for the
ATS demonstration:
a. 11ACW/DOXXQ -- Capt Pierce
b. 11ACW/DOP -- SSgtMyher
c. 11 ACW/LGOR -- MSgtDeLuca
d. 1 1 ACW/LGKC - MSgt Shuler
e. 11 ACW/LGKM -- TSgtCushman
f. 744ADS/DOO -- Lt McNeil
g. 21stTFW/DOW -- Capt Hill
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this experiment will be to determine whether or not Litton
Data Systems Advanced Tracking System (ATS) is capable of more efficiently
managing the flow of radar data coming into the Region Operations Control
Center (ROCC). Managing the radar data more efficiently will enable the
operators to realize the full operational capabilities of the new radars without
overloading the ROCC Central Computer. As a result, the demonstration is
designed to provide insight into the radar data management problems being
experienced by the Alaska NORAD Region (ANR) and the ability of the ATS to
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solve them. Specifically, the ANR would like to determine the validity of the
claims of the ATS's capabilities. For example: Can the ATS accurately
discriminate true targets from clutter? From an air defense point of view, can the
ATS provide target discrimination without target elimination?
The demonstration will select three sites, all equipped with ECPs. All of
the ECPs will be turned off for the demonstration in order to reestablish the radars
to a fully sensitized state. The ATS must prove that it is capable of handling the
data workload from a fully sensitized radar.
The ATS will not be installed at the selected radars because of the logistics
and prohibitive costs. Instead, the ATS equipment will be installed in the ROCC.
The ATS will be connected at the ROCC Communications Segment, the
point where the data arrives in the ROCC via satellite from the selected radars.
The data arriving at this point has not yet been processed by the ROCC central
computer. Therefore, connecting the ATS at the ROCC Communications
Segment simulates the ATS processing the data at the radar site.
The next step will be to compare the amount of data a fully sensitized radar
forwards with the amount of data a fully sensitized radar equipped with an ATS
forwards. The ROCC provides the capability to simultaneously measure ATS and
non-ATS data from the same site (see Figure 4)[Ref. 10]. The reduction in data,
and the quality of the data must be analyzed simultaneously. The ATS may live
up to its clutter reduction claims, but the data has to be analyzed to ensure that
the ATS is not eliminating or erroneously manipulating valid air targets necessary
for air defense and air training missions. In order to verify the target data, a
specific number of aircraft, flying different profiles, will be used. The experiment
will be designed to control the number of aircraft. However, the actual flight
















by a third party, disassociated from the experiment. Only after the experiment is
completed and the analysis turned in will the aircraft portion of the experiment be
revealed. The purpose of this single blind design is to eliminate any bias from the
experimenters.
The anticipated results: Measurable differences between the quantity of
data received from a radar in a fully sensitized state, when equipped with an ATS
and when not, are expected. However, whether or not the ATS eliminates valid
air targets remains to be seen.
C. THE SCOPE OF THE DEMONSTRATION:
This demonstration will provide the information the 11th AF Commander
needs to decide whether or not the ATS (or other associated Radar Data
Management System) provides viable solutions to the radar data management
problems experienced by the ANR. There are several potential benefits if the ATS
demonstration proves successful. First, ECPs can be eliminated from the radars,
restoring them to their full operational capability, and providing greater low level
detection of aircraft and missiles. In the area of training, the improved detection
capability will increase the radar coverage in the low level training areas.
Benefits should also be seen in the ROCC central computer. Installing the
ATS at the radar head will decentralize the computer processing. The ATS will
discriminate between clutter and target data, dump the clutter data, and pass only
the target data to the central computer for further processing. The main benefits
to the central computer are reductions in the amount of processing required and
the potential for a computer overload that arbitrarily dumps data.
The reduced computer workload will enable the installation of additional
radars. This is important because PACAF wants to expand the air training ranges
in Alaska. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo and subsequent loss of a major air
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training exercise in the Philippines called Cope Thunder required more training,
and thus an expansion of the air training ranges, in Alaska. As a result, additional
radars are needed to provide coverage in these new training areas. However, the
additional data from these sites could easily create an overload condition in the
computer. Dumping data during a major exercise would seriously jeopardize the
safety of the entire mission.
The life of the central computer will be prolonged because the amount of data
the central computer has to process will be eased. Thus, the costly acquisition of
a new generation ROCC computer can be delayed.
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II. REVISED EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. SETUP:
1. Physical
The physical setup is the crux of the entire experiment. The
demonstration would not be possible if not for the flexibility of the ROCC
system. Figure 4 depicts the actual physical interface between the ROCC and the
ATS equipment. The following is a discussion of the ROCC-ATS interface.
The digital switch provides the interconnection between the
communication channels from the radar sites and the central computer. The radar
data at the digital switch has not been processed by the ROCC computer. Each
radar sends its data to the digital switch at the ROCC via three 2.4 kbps
communications channels. These channels feed directly into three ports
associated with each radar at the digital switch. Two ports, designated A and B,
are normally interconnected with the primary and standby central computers.
The third port, designated C, is available for recording data on a noninterference
basis. This is the location of the ROCC-ATS interface. At the same time, the cable
from port B of the Digital Switch to the central computer will be disconnected at
the computer, and the output from the ATS will be connected to the standby
computer at its input channel (Figure 4).
2. Factors:
There are three experimental factors: radar sites at three levels; Litton
ATS at two levels; and analysis equipment at two levels. Three radar sites have
been chosen: Kotzebue, Cape Romanzof, and Tatalina (Figure 2). The ATS radar
processing hardware/software is either on or off. Finally, the equipment being
used to analyze the data is either third party, Air Force approved, test and
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evaluation equipment or the Litton Data Systems analysis program associated
with the ATS.
3. Special Equipment:
a. The ATS consists of all of the interface hardware as well as the
software to conduct the data collection and analysis. All will be provided by
Litton Data Systems.
b. A neutral third party will be involved to provide balance and
legitimacy to the experiment. This third party (i.e. 84th Radar Evaluation
Squadron) must conduct the experiment in parallel with Litton. They must
interface at the same location, with the same site, and at the same time. They will
collect the data, analyze it, and compare their results with Litton's experimental
results.
c. Aircraft will be dedicated to fly certain profiles within the coverage
limits of the selected radar.
4. Schedule of Trials:
The schedule of trials will not be formally addressed in this sample plan.
The driving factor for the schedule of trials will be the availability of the aircraft
needed to fly the flight profiles. Making up a schedule of trials does not provide
sufficient lessons learned.
B. HYPOTHESES:
1 a. There is no difference between the amount of data forwarded by the fully
sensitized radar and the radar equipped with the ATS.
lb. The alternative: There is a difference between the amount of data
forwarded by the fully sensitized radar and the radar equipped with the ATS.
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2a. There is no difference between the number of targets reported by the
ROCC computer combined with the fully sensitized radar and the radar equipped
with an ATS.
2b. There is a difference between the number of targets reported by the
ROCC computer combined with the fully sensitized radar and the radar equipped
with an ATS.
3a. There is no difference between the third party analysis results and the
Litton Data Systems analysis results.
3b. There is a difference between the third party analysis results and the
Litton Data Systems analysis results.
The first two hypotheses deal with the issues of quantity and quality of the
data the ATS produces. Does the ATS make a difference in the amount of data
being sent back to the ROCC central computer? And, does the ATS discriminate
targets from clutter without eliminating valid air targets?
The third hypothesis is designed to validate the Litton demonstration by
determining whether or not the data is consistent with that from an established
test and evaluation system. The 1 l tn ACW staff must be sure that the ATS works
as claimed and that the analysis tools that are part of the equipment package




Litton's interface hardware is compatible with the ROCC equipment
2. The software will provide the type of analysis needed to answer the
research questions.
3. The weather patterns and clutter density at the three sites are
representative of the (AOR) overall.
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4. Both Litton and the third party Air Force evaluation equipment is capable
of counting and keeping track of the number of targets received from the radar.
Note: This assumption is based on the claims of Litton that its software has
the capability to compile this type of information [Ref. 3]. Additionally, since the
ROCC computer, a 1970s version computer, has the capability to count the
number of tracks in the system, and is certified, it is assumed that the evaluation
equipment exists within the Air Force, or else the ROCC computer could not
have been certified in the first place.
D. STATISTICAL DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT
The experiment is a 3 X 2 X 2 factorial single blind experiment. This means
that one factor has three levels and the other two factors each have two levels.
The first factor has three levels because of the selection of three different radar
sites. The radar sites associated with these levels are: Kotzebue, Cape Romanzof,
and Tatalina. This factor corresponds to hypotheses one and two stated above.
The processing equipment is the second factor. The two levels are whether or not
the radar is utilizing the ATS. This factor also corresponds to hypotheses one and
two. The third factor is analysis equipment. The two levels for this factor are the
third party operationally approved equipment and the Litton analysis equipment.
This factor corresponds to hypothesis number three. The purpose of designing a
single blind experiment is to eliminate experimenter bias and to serve as a means
to evaluate whether or not the ATS is eliminating valid air targets.
E. MEASURES
The experiment is designed to evaluate the data forwarded by the radar. The
data will be collected and reduced into two categories. The first category deals
with the quantity of data and the second deals with the quality of data (target
elimination). The categories of data are listed below.
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Category one: Quantity. The total amount of data processed and sent by
the radar to the ROCC, measured in bits per second.
Category two: Quality. The total number of targets being sent by the radar
to the ROCC, measured by the total number of targets being sent by the ROCC
computer to the operator.
F. INSTRUMENTATION
The instrumentation is the equipment used by Litton and the third party Air
Force evaluation team to collect and analyze the data.
G. TESTING & PILOT TRIALS
Testing will be done to ensure the ATS and third party equipment can be
connected to the ROCC digital switch. Additional testing will be done to ensure
the commander that the experiment will not interfere with the daily operations of
the ROCC.
After the interfaces are made, pilot trials will be run to ensure that the data
being collected is the correct data to test the hypotheses. The researchers will use
the pilot testing to practice the experimental procedures. For planning purposes,
time should be allotted in the master schedule for the pilot testing.
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III. REVISED DATA DESCRIPTION
Table 1 presents the data coding scheme. The table depicts the three factors
(Radar Sites, Analysis Equipment, Processing Equipment) along with their
associated levels. The number in parenthesis is the code assigned to the particular
level. The coding scheme will become apparent when the table listing the
different combinations of trials is presented below.
TABLE 1 DATA CODING SCHEME
Radar Sites Analysis Equipment Processing Equipment
Kotzebue ( 1
)
Third Party ( 1
)
Non ATS ( 1
)
CapeRomanzoff(2) Litton (2) ATS (2)
Tatalina (3)
The data is divided into two categories.
Data: Total amount of data received from the radar (X in bits per second)
Total number of tracks (Y)
The data is divided into two categories to aid in the analysis, but it will all be
collected at once for each trial. The computer software of the evaluation
equipment will reduce the data into the X and Y categories designated above.
Table 2 depicts the combinations of levels of the factors. There are twelve
combinations of factor levels, found by multiplying one factor with three levels
and two factors each with two levels. Each of the trials will be replicated thirty
times in order to assume the data approximates a normal distribution.
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TABLE 2 TRIALS
Trial # Radar Sites Ailaly.si.s Equip. Processing Equip. Data (X) Data (Y)
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 2
3 1 2 1
4 1 2 2
5 2 1 1
6 2 1 2
7 2 2 1
8 2 2 2
9 3 1 1
10 3 1 2
11 3 2 1
12 3 2 2
There are a several steps in the data collection process. The first step is to
collect all of the data the radar is sending to the ROCC. The total amount of data
will be used by the analysis to answer hypotheses one and three. Target counts
will then be compiled using the software capabilities of the computers. The target
counts will be used to answer hypothesis number two. Additionally, the target
count data can be used to provide supplementary information concerning
hypotheses numbers three.
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IV. REVISED ANALYSIS PLAN
Balanced Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) will be used to analyze the data.
The results will determine the outcome of the hypotheses tests. As indicated in
the data section, there are two parts to the plan. The first section will use the
balanced ANOVA to analyze the total amount of data. Thirty replications of each
of the twelve trials will be made. This will be done to assume normality. The
second phase of the analysis will also use balanced ANOVA, this time to analyze
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